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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the historical development of the right-toknow concept in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act
(EPCRA) of 1986. It starts with the use of words during the American Revolution,
words capacious or general enough to later include the modern right-to-know
idea. It also traces the real emergence of the right-to-know concept during the
Cold War years of the 1950s and 1960s, including the enactment of the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966. Some of the limitations of the FOIA are
discussed here, limited as it was and is by nine broad ―exemptions‖ to the
release of information by the federal Executive Branch. This study deals with an
important legislative response to environmental disasters and near-disasters,
with the aid of the Anti-Toxic and Environmental Justice movements of the late
20th century and ending with the enactment of EPCRA in 1986 and its effects in
subsequent decades. This historical account also provides a brief analysis on
how the legislation based on the right-to-know principle opened opportunities for
the field of communication, especially environmental risk communication. EPCRA
was the first federal law in the United States to fully embrace the right-to-know
approach to public policy, also known as regulation through revelation. The rightto-know approach is based on the ideas of self-governance and public
participation in the decision-making process. EPCRA has served as a model for
more than 80 countries, which adopted laws based on the right-to-know principle
in different levels since EPCRA‘s enactment.
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INTRODUCTION
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but
the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.
Thomas Jefferson1
―For knowledge itself is a power,‖ Sir Francis Bacon wrote in 1597 in his
Meditationes Sacrae.2 In an open democratic state, power comes from the
people and therefore people should have the necessary knowledge to partake in
the decision-making process of their own government. In the United States of
America, seen sometimes as an example of democracy for the rest of the world,
the political system is actually ―a republic,‖ as Benjamin Franklin asserted after
the Constitutional Convention on September 18, 1787, adding, ―if you can keep
it.‖
The word republic comes from the Latin Res Publica, meaning ―public
thing/affair‖ or ―belonging to the public.‖ The concept of a republic, like the
concepts of democracy and open government, implies that the government has a
mandate to represent the interests of the true power-holders, the people. That
system differs greatly from the earlier monarchic systems, where kings and
queens claimed a right, even divine right, to rule over the people. This
differentiation was in the core of the American Revolution and can be said to be
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, as can be seen in its second
1

Ep igraph: Tho mas Jefferson, letter to Williams Charles Jarv is, September 28, 1820.
Francis Bacon. Meditations Sacrae and Human Philosophy (Kessinger Publishing, 1996; original wo rk
published in1597), 71.
2
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paragraph: ―That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.‖ 3 The
Founding Fathers of the republic wanted, above all, independence, both
economic and political. 4
Many of them believed that a well-informed public makes for better
decision making than an elite of chosen patricians or nobles. That idea, born in
the ideological war against King George III of England during the American
Revolution, resurged during the later part of the 20 th century as the core of a new
perspective (and some say new paradigm) in public policy. 5 The right-to-know
approach to public policy—also known as regulation through revelation—is
based on the ideas of self-governance and public participation in the decisionmaking process 6 and was finally made into a federal law in the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA) of 1986.

7

This dissertation investigates the historical development of the right-toknow concept in EPCRA, starting in the American Revolution, passing through
the Anti-toxic and Environmental Justice Movements from the second half of the
3

The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America , § 2. See Appendix.
Uh m, Kiul. 2008. “The Founders and the Revolutionary Underpinning of the Concept of the Right to
Know.” J&MC Quarterly 85, no. 2: 393-416.
5
Karkkainen, Bradley C. 2000. “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradig m,” Georgetown Law Journal 89: 257-370; K.M. Shrivastava's
book, The Right to Information: A Global Perspective (New Yo rk: Lancer, 2009), refers to more than 80
countries have adopted laws using the right to know princip le.
6
James T. Hamilton. Regulation through revelation: The origins, politics, and impacts of the Toxic Release
Inventory Program. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert V. Percival, Christopher H.
Schroeder, Allan S. Miller, and James P. Leape. Environmental Regulation: Law, science, and policy. 5th
ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers , 2006); Ann Florini. ed. The right to know: transparency for an open
world. (New Yo rk: Co lu mbia University Press , 2007).
7
EPCRA, 1986. 42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq., partially codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). EPCRA was
initially written as Title III of the Superfund A mendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, but it
was enacted as a free-standing law.
4
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20th century and ending with the effects of EPCRA in the late 20 th century early
21st century, analytically observing how the legislation based on the right-to-know
principle opened opportunities for the field of communication, especially
environmental risk communication. 8
In the last decades of the 20 th century, authors including Anthony Giddens
and Ulrich Beck started to see how the rapidly growing complexity of modern
social organizations made it virtually impossible for any governmental institution
to deal with social problems relying solely on governmental apparatuses. 9 At the
same time, more and more authors in the social sciences and humanities have
pointed out the failure of exclusively market-based policies in providing just and
desirable conditions to society as a whole. The context in which the 21 st century
society begun became known as what Beck called ―the risk society.‖ 10
In the United States, realizations about the failure of governmental
institutions, both ―command-and-control,‖ where the government set and
enforced the rules through penalties, and ―market-based,‖ where government

8

Marc D. Shapiro found strong scientific support that, among the causes for environ mental injustices in
issues involving toxic chemicals, “changes in emission patterns are affected by a community‟s ability to
process complex info rmation and its capacity for collective act ion.” Also, Rebecca S. Weeks found that the
most effective co mmun ities in preparing fo r to xic emergencies were making use of creative
communicat ions approaches to EPCRA, including the Internet, phone books, calendars, mouse pads,
grocery bags, refrigerator magnets, brochures, newspaper articles, v ideos for the local govern ment
channels, and even utility bills inserts to identify elderly membe rs who might need special help. Weeks also
found that community members will only act proactively towards emergency planning after receiving
messages relating to emergency planning almost two dozen t imes. Shapiro, Marc. D. “Equity and
Information: Information Regulation, Environmental Justice, and Risks fro m To xic Chemicals.” Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 24, no. 2 (2005): 373-398; Weeks, Rebecca S. “The Bu mpy Road to
Co mmunity Preparedness: The Emergency Planning and Co mmunity Right -to-know Act.” Environmental
Law 4, no. 827 (1997-1998): 827-889.
9
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity. (Palo A lto; Chicago: Stanford University Press, 1991).
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992; original wor k
published in Germany in 1986).
10
More on the contextualization of the risk society is provided in chapter III.
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offers incentives like tax reductions for compliance, policies gave birth to a series
of social movements. Among them, two became especially significant in
promoting new ways to deal with the complexities of the new state of public
affairs: the Anti-toxic Movement, later transformed into the Environmental Health
Movement, and the Environmental Justice Movement. 11 By the end of the 1970s,
entire communities were living in and suffering from the aftermath of
environmental disasters (toxic spills from factories, placement of hazardous
materials waste sites closer to ethnic and poor communities, double standards
for sanitation of richer and poorer communities, etc .). These communities started
to fight back, using information and community organizatio n as their weapons of
choice. Far from isolated situations, these problems were widespread 12 and
became part not only of mainstream news media reports, but also part of the
cultural identity of the late 20 th century through a series of prize-winning,
bestseller books and blockbuster movies. 13
Love Canal became one of the most cited toxic-chemical-related incidents
both in the academic and non-academic literature, but it was small compared to
the thousands of accidents and criminal acts involving dumping and spilling of
hazardous and toxic materials that followed in the years after the Love Canal
11

The capitalization of the movements‟ names follow the majority of studies used in this dissertation.
More than 7,000 accidents involving spills of to xic and hazardous materials were registered between
1980 and 1985 in the U.S. Falkenberry, E. M. 1995. “The Emergency planning and Community Right-toKnow Act: A tool for to xic release reduction in the 90‟s.” Bu ffalo Environmental Law Journal 3, no. 1: 136.
13
Erin Brockovich, a blockbuster movie written by Susannah Grant, directed by Steven Soderbergh and
with Ju lia Roberts in an Oscar-winning role, won 26 awards and was nominated for another 42. Jonathan
Harr‟s book A Civil Action is still acclaimed as one of the most influential non-fict ion bestsellers and was
followed by a movie version of the same name with John Travolta in the lead ro le. Both stories were based
on real cases of towns that were contaminated by toxic spills fro m nearby plan ts.
12
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incident. 14 All the attention from the media and popular outrage resulted in laws
like the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund. Even so, it was an international
incident in Bhopal, India that caught the attention of a few members of the
American Congress to another aspect of those tragedies: the absolute incapacity
of the government to deal with the matter by itself.
An accident in a U.S.-owned Union Carbide‘s pesticide plant in 1984
caused the release of a cloud of the lethal gas methyl isocyanate (MIC) into the
air over Bhopal, a city located in the state of Madhya Pradesh in central India.
Amnesty International counted 7,000 deaths immediately after the release and
another 15,000 due to associated illnesses in the following years. In 2004,
Amnesty International asserted that more than 100,000 people still suffered from
diseases associated with the toxic gases and many more fell ill from breathing
them. Although Union Carbide Corporation still denied any responsibility for the
disaster,15 more than a 145 law suits 16 followed the disaster in the American
courts. In 1985, an accident in another Union Carbide plant involving a less lethal
gas than MIC caused the 135 people to be hospitalized in Institute, West Virginia,
after the plant passed two safety examinations.

14

See footnote 12.
“A Bitter Wind in Bhopal.,” 2004. A mnesty International,
http://web.amnesty.org/wire/December2004/Bhopal (accessed June 28, 2007). The nu mbers of deaths
directly related to the incident varies fro m source to source. Amnesty International‟s numbers are on the
high average. Other reports vary fro m 2,000 immed iate deaths to 10,000 and fro m 60,000 to 150,000
associated illnesses.
16
Most of the lawsuits were settled, some were still wait ing for a decision in November, 2008.
15
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Finally understanding the impossibility of a sufficiently rapid response to
such disasters and fearing a large-scale catastrophe on American soil, federal
policymakers proposed a new law based on the right-to-know idea. The objective
was to approach the problem with a preventive mindset or, at least, provide a
much faster locally-based response. In 1986, Congress enacted EPCRA, a
legislative rarity17 in the United States, 18 which has become a precursor and
model for many similar openness policies in more than 80 other nations. 19
This study traces briefly the origins of the ideological concept of the
public‘s right to know in the writings of Thomas Paine, George Mason, James
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson as a fundamental part of the new republican
system of 1787. It will then follow the developments of the right-to-know concept
in the 20th century with the birth of the Anti-toxic Movement that had the right to
know about the existence and effects of toxic materials in the environment and in
communities as one of its main claims. After this background, this study looks
into how the idea of the public‘s right to know evolved into a new public policy
approach with the enactment of EPCRA. Lastly, as the community-right-to-know

17

EPCRA was the first law to use the right-to-know approach to public policy in the country, instead of a
“command-and-control” or a “market-based” approach.
18
Uh m, “The Founders.” Uh m‟s argu ment that the right to know should be a constitutional right, although
historically accurate in its presentation, still is more of an academic discussion and has no official
constitutional standing. As Uhm ad mits, the Supreme Court of the United States has found a First
Amend ment right of access to government information only in the setting of coverage o f criminal trials.
See also Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Co mmunications, 12th ed. (New Yo rk:
Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press), 492, citing Rich mond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100
S.Ct. 2814 (1980). According to both Uhm and to Teeter and Loving, the Supreme Court‟s understanding
of the topic can be summarized by Justice Potter Stewart‟s speech about the Pentagon Papers at Yale in
1974 as the justice said that the press is free to fight secrecy, but has no constitutional guarantee that it will
succeed.
19
Kshitindra Mohan Shrivastava. The Right to Information: A Global Perspective. (New Delhi: Lancer
Publishers, 2009).
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idea at the core of EPCRA created communication opportunities for different
groups in society, this dissertation provides a critical discussion on how these
opportunities came to be and what they mean for the practice and research of
communication.

Content organization
This dissertation consists of a mix of historical narrative, historiographic
analysis, and critical investigations of academic literature and of relevant
government records and other primary sources. 20 It explores the historical
contexts in which the right-to-know concept was created, developed, and
transformed into what it is today in EPCRA, what it means for society, and its
impacts on the study of communication and public policy in environmental issues.
With those objectives in mind, Chapter 1 defines the methodological approach
used in this dissertation and provides a road map of the analytical tools used to
write the history of EPCRA and discuss its importance in today‘s society.
Chapter 2 presents an historiographic analysis 21 of the origins of the
ideological concept of right to know as an instrumental principle of open
governments as presented in the writings of a few Founding Fathers of the
United States, especially Thomas Jefferson. It then jumps to the resurgence of
the debate on the right to know in the 1950s as consequence of the end of World
War II. The narrative culminates with the enactment of EPCRA in 1986.
20

A comp lete description of the methodology and use of primary and secondary sources can be found in
the next chapter. Also, see Appendix fo r a list of primary sources.
21
In Chapter 2, a mix of p rimary sources and secondary sources was used to verify the origins of the
writings, as exp lained in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 3 tells the story of the resurgence of the right-to-know concept
through an analysis of the academic literature on the development of the Antitoxic Movement and, later, the Environmental Justice Movement. Starting from
an analytical framework based on a description of the late 20 th century society by
Ulrich Beck, the chapter provides justification and context for the development of
the movement. It also introduces the theoretical and pragmatic tools used by the
movements, and used by researchers to study the movements‘ activities, as
related to the field of communication.
The first part of the chapter refers to the developments and consequences
of what Beck called the ―risk society‖ and its contextualization as a fertile ground
for community organization, risk management, and self-governance as they are
directly related to the right-to-know principle and the idea of toxic risks. The
second part of the Chapter 3 presents a narrative of the development of the
social movements that guided the resurgence of the right to know, starting in the
Conservation Movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s, passing through the
Civil Rights and Environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but mai nly
focusing on the movements of the 1970s, like the Anti-toxic Movement, and their
evolution into the beginning of the 21st century. The third part of Chapter 3
defines the communication tools that have been mainly used by those
movements and as a reaction to them: environmental and risk communication.
Chapter 4 presents EPCRA‘s history. In this chapter, the discussions and
struggles within society and Congress—especially the role of James J. Florio,
main author of both CERCLA and SARA/EPCRA—about the conceptualization of
13

the law are presented in historical narrative based on official records, newspaper
stories, and a variety of other historical documents and secondary sources. The
main objective is to expose the nuances, assumptions, understandings, and
turbulences involved in the enactment of the legislation and its right-to-know
approach. The chapter goes on to show the reactions to and developments of
EPCRA as the ripples of its enactment changed the way certain groups relate to
public policy and general behavior about toxic waste issues in society.
Lastly, through a critical summary of the previous chapters, Chapter 5
presents a discussion on how the right to know has become more and more
accepted as an approach to public policy. It focuses on how the right to know
affects the study of communication, putting the field in the forefront of public life.
As the famous British sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote, ―such information or
knowledge is not incidental to modern institutions, but constitutive of them.‖ 22
Likewise, EPCRA forced the compilation and distribution of information about
release and storage of toxic chemicals, which became constitutive of the
organizations, public and private, that dealt with it.

22

Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity, 20.
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CHAPTER 1: MATERIALS AND METHODS

History and Historiography
The will is free, but who can account for his own acts and opinions
without invoking influences and accidents? Would I have devoted
my life to reading and teaching history, would I feel so keenly the
passion of an era – five hundred years of high creation going down
in confusion; would I, instead of repining, cultivate and recommend
a spirited pessimism if I had not had, at a particular time and place,
a vivid sight of an earlier world, soon followed by its collapse in
wretchedness and folly?
Jacques Barzun23

As Calvin once said in Bill Waterson's iconic comic strip Calvin and
Hobbes, ―History is the fiction we invent to persuade ourselves that events are
knowable and that life has order and direction.‖ In a way, Waterson revealed
some of the most intrinsic problems of History as a methodological approach to
research. Historical events cannot be captured in any other way but through
partial or trace evidence, including surviving documents and public and personal
accounts, although circumstantial evidence can point us in certain directions.
Details, intentions, and emotions are filtered through the perceptions of
witnesses and/or first-person accounts (i.e. letters, journals, newspapers, official
records, etc.) that might be misleading, either purposely or accidentally. The
context, if misinterpreted, can lead to false assumptions and inaccurate
conclusions.

23

Jacques Barzun. “To ward a Fateful Seren ity,” in A Jacques Barzun Reader: Selections from His Works,
ed. Michael Murray (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 3.
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The historical narrative provides a first impression about specific events,
but it also fills the blanks left by the lack of surviving evidence with interpretations
from archaeologists, historians and other scholars. But such accounts can also
be contaminated with ontological and axiological understandings that do not fit
ones that existed at the moment of the event. Even the very perception of time as
a linear phenomenon is accepted almost only by modern Western civilization. 24
Joseph Strayer, renowned historian of the 20 th century, once explained how
difficult it was to justify historical research to scientists because historical
methods are ―more of an art than a science.‖ 25
However, in defense of history and historiography as a valid social
scientific methodology, more arguments favor the approach than undermine it.
Stephen Bahn26 concluded, based on Frank Kermode's differentiating of history 27
and fiction and John Cannon‘s28 critique on the use of present-day bias to
analyze past historical events, that historians and other history practitio ners
should work even harder on what distinguishes history from fiction:
If the difference between history and fiction is indeed not a
cognitive one, but an institutional or more precisely a cultural one,
then it is none the less a difference of extreme importance. And its
recognition should lead not indeed to skepticism about the
―philosophic base‖ of historiography, but to a renewed investigation
of the discursive form of that ―history‖ to which we rightly give such
24

Most ancient oriental cultures and even powerful civilizations of the West like the Maya, Incas and
Aztecs believed in cyclical time.
25
Joseph R. Strayer, introduction to The Interpretation of History, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Peter
Smith, 1950), 3-26, 3.
26
Bahn, Stephen. “Towards a Critical Historiography: Recent Work in Ph ilosophy of History.” Philosophy
56, no. 217 (1981): 365-385.
27
Frank Kermode. The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (Cambridge, MA, and
London: Harvard Un iversity Press, 1979).
28
John Cannon, ed.. The Historian at Work (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980).
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a privileged position. In other words, the awareness that historical
narrative has no cognitive privilege over fictional narrative should
not result in a mere recrudescence of the conventional barrier
between the two. It should result in the employment of all the
diverse and sophisticated methods of literary analysis to tell us
more about what remains, none the less, the unique province of
history. 29

All research methodologies have limitations and a good part of those
limitations can be attributed to a poor understanding of methodological processes
in first place. History is no different. David Hackett Fischer 30 wrote: ―The vital
purpose of refining and extending a logic of historical thought is not merely some
pristine goal of scholarly perfection. It involves the issue of survival.‖
Loren Eiseley31 once wrote about the need for history and a
methodological understanding of the past:
Their world, therefore, becomes increasingly the violent,
unpredictable world of the first men simply because, in losing faith
in the past, one is inevitably forsaking all that enables man to be a
planning animal. For man's story, in brief, is essentially that of a
creature who has abandoned instinct and replaced it with cultural
tradition and the hard-won increments of contemplative thought.
The lessons of the past have been found to be a reasonably secure
instruction for proceeding against the unknown future. To hurl
oneself recklessly, without method, upon a future that we ourselves
have complicated is a sheer nihilistic rejection of all that history,
including the classical world, can teach us.

According to this view, history is a method of survival, an intellectual
arsenal to understand what has been in order to inform what will come. The loss

29

Bahn, “To wards a Crit ical Historiography,” 368.
David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought. (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1970), 317.
31
Eiseley, Lo ren. “Activis m and the Rejection of History.” Science, New Series, 165, no. 3889 (Ju l. 11,
1969), 129.
30
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of history can do great damage to society, as seen in the Middle Ages, which
threw human civilization into shambles for more than a thousand years. In that
time, people lived short lives, virtually imprisoned by localism and suffocated by
ignorance and superstition. Devastating diseases such as the black plague and
constant wars were the lot of that brutish time. 32 Most of the knowledge lost
during the Dark Ages (especially in medicine, mechanics and engineering) are
finally beginning to be recovered through archaeology and history after being
completely submerged for centuries. More than that, history is, according to
Michel Foucault, ―the first and as it were the mother of all the sciences of man,
and is perhaps as old as human memory.‖ 33
History, as a methodological approach, is a powerful tool to reveal what
no other scientific methodology can: a contextually rich understanding of how
phenomena and events are born and developed and, most importantly, how they
relate to other phenomena and events. Fischer 34 argued that history, when
properly done, can be useful in ―several substantive ways.‖ 35 According to him,
history clarifies and contextualizes contemporary problems by exposing empirical
evidence of the causality of events; it provides content for scientific forecasting 36
by establishing historical trends. It helps refine theoretical knowledge by
shedding light on the historical conditions in which an event or phenomenon

32

William Manchester. A World Lit Only by Fire: The Medieval Mind and the Renaissance: Portrait of an
Age (Boston; London: Little, Brown and Co mpany, 1993)
33
Michel Foucault. The Order of Things (London and New Yo rk: Routledge Classics, 2008).
34
Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 315-318.
35
Ibid. 315.
36
Although it can be argued that scientific forecasting constitutes nothing but informed guesses, it is thanks
to historical knowledge that they are, at least, “informed.”
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happened. It aids in the quest for self understanding and the acceptance of
others by showing that all societies are results of historical choices and
processes. Once aware of those processes, people can make better choices in
the future. Finally, history can help people to become better and more conscious
thinkers by providing an understanding of cause and consequence of any given
action. Fischer suggested that such understanding of history may help instill a
feeling of responsibility for people‘s actions as they can understand their
consequences based on past similar events. However, Fischer argued that, in
order for history to be useful, historians need to refine their practices and
understandings of the historiographic process. 37
According to Jacques Barzun, the criteria by which history may be known
are four: Narrative, Chronology, Concreteness, and Memorability. History is,
before all things, a story (Narrative) that gives particulars of change within time
and place (Chronology) based on what actually happened (Concreteness)—and
not on ideas and philosophical conjectures – about an event that is both worth
remembering and capable of being remembered (Memorability). 38
After an avalanche of healthy cultural criticism against positivism and
positivistic history, Fischer argued that the result, instead of the betterment of
historiography was the abandonment of methodological rigor in the field.
According to Fischer, in the place of looking to improve the intrinsic

37

Fischer, preface to Historians’ Fallacies, xix.
Barzun. “History as Counter-method and Anti-abstraction,” in A Jacques Barzun Reader: Selections
From His Works, ed. Michael Murray (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 22-23.
38
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methodological logic, historians embraced a ―hate‖ for it, or as Fischer called it,
historians embraced ―misology.‖ 39
To correct misology without repeating the mistakes of early positivistic
historians, 40 Fischer described a list of common mistakes, or ―fallacies,‖
historians in general commit. Fischer‘s work provided a useful introduction to
―committing‖ good historiography, but certainly not enough. Logic is important in
historical cultural criticism as cultural criticism is essential in the interpretation of
history. Historical methodology emphasizing the use of artifacts and primary
sources not only improves accuracy, but also the contextualization of the
historical moment through a diverse and comprehensive use of primary sources.
As importantly, the interpretation of history should always expose the cultural
contextualization of the time of the event and not reflect present-day bias.
Bahn also showed how the sophistication process can be advanced by
drawing on the French Annalles school and on Michel Foucault‘s writings in
developing a truly critical historiography. Although Bahn upheld Foucault‘s
method as the ultimate example of sophistication, he also observed that Foucault
worked from an advantage because his analyses came later; they are an
analytical history of the historical method itself.
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Fischer defines misology as the prejudice against logic or, in h is own words, “logic -hating.” Fischer,
preface to Historians’ Fallacies, xi.
40
Cu ltural h istorians usually point out that early positivistic historians tended to make assumptions about
history based on their own cultural values and reject rev isionism.
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―To say that now we all more or less take cultural history for granted does
not, of course, mean that we all understand it in the same way,‖ wrote Barzun 41
in 1956. My approach for this dissertation draws on cultural and critical history
following specific understandings from specific scholars and historians. The
historical method I follow in this work originated from Walter Benjamin‘s concept
of cultural history, which built on and improved the original definition provided by
Jacob Burckhardt in the mid 1800s. 42 Benjamin43 started his conceptualization of
history by appropriating some of Friedrich Engels‘s interpretations, especially
Engels‘s idea that the understanding of the history of ideas as a logical
progression represented a new dogma. Benjamin transformed that argument into
a harsh critique of the assumption of continuous historical development as an
eternal image of the past. For Benjamin, historical materialism exposed the
historical narrative as a unique experience of the past that is ―directed toward a
consciousness of the present which explodes the continuum of history.‖ 44 In his
concept, ―To bring about the consolidation of experience with history, which is
original for every present, is the task of historical materialism.‖ 45
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Barzun. “Cu ltural History: A Synthesis,” in A Jacques Barzun reader: Selections From His Works, ed.
Michael Murray (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 27.
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After Benjamin, many historians, philosophers, social scientists, and
humanists tried to define the role of history and historiography in light of the new
self awareness of history practitioners and philosophers. ―In modern thought,
historicism and the analytic of finitude confront one another,‖ Foucault wrote.
―Historicism is a means to validating for itself the perpetual critical relation at play
between History and the human sciences,‖ 46 he continued. In Foucault‘s view, we
can never fully dismiss historicism, but, at the same time, we need to put
historicism in check by providing a full critique which exposes the reasons behi nd
the justifications provided by historicism:
This is why the analysis of finitude never ceases to use, as a
weapon against historicism, the part of itself that historicism has
neglected: its aim is to reveal, at the foundation of all the positivities
and before them, the finitude that makes them possible; where
historicism sought for the possibility and justification of concrete
relations between limited totalities, whose mode of being was
predetermined by life, or by social forms, or by the significations of
language, the analytic of finitude tries to question this relation of
human being to the being which, by designating finitude, renders
the positivities possible in their concrete mode of being. 47
It is important to notice that Foucault‘s understood historicism as the
historians‘ common practice of providing a justificatio n for past events and
actions. According to him, the problem with this practice is that the reasons
behind any event or action may not be knowable or, worse, not even have
existed. In that way, this practice can be used to manufacture historical
justifications for present actions, which Foucault opposed. Fischer, another
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antagonist of historicism, calls it a pernicious error, converting a temporal
sequence into an ethical system or ―history into morality.‖ 48
Mark Jarzombek called historiography ―the dialectical equivalent in history
of the modernist notion of self-consciousness,‖ 49 thus, he continued a few
paragraphs later, ―a Critical Historiography … functions on the principle that
history … [is] only as strong as the historiography that simultaneously critiques
[it].‖ 50 The work of historiography is to reveal the holes, viewpoints, interests, and
discontinuities in history in order to provide a fair closure to the historical
narrative, which usually tends to be absolutist.
As Fischer proposed, logic must be found in historical methodology and
historians must denounce fallacies wherever they find them. But the historical
logic cannot be the mathematical logic of a simple sum, but a more complex logic
of an equation where variables substitute for known numbers. The methodology
also must allow room for the fact that some variables may never be known.
Fundamentally important is the idea that the one who tells the story reveals
her/himself as the mathematician who will determine value to those variables. As
Jacques Barzun wrote:
History is concrete and complex; everything in it is individual and
entangled. Reading it, mulling it over does not weaken concern with
the present, but it brings detachment from the immediate and thus
cures ―the jumps‖ – seeing every untoward event as menacing,
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every success or defeat as permanent, every opponent as a
monster of error. 51

If successful in this self critique, Critical Historiography provides History
with the sophistication Fischer and Bahn requested through the questioning of
the process of acquiring, interpreting, narrating, and finally questioning and
rethinking the interpretations of historical facts and artifacts. It also questions the
position of the one who questions—meaning that it has an inherent self critique.
In this system, History becomes much more powerful as an approach to
academic research as it reveals not only the context in which the past event
occurred, but also the context in which that past event is being analyzed in the
present.
This trajectory of History and Historiography as critical methods of
research showed that, although debates about the worthiness of the
methodology will go on, most of the arguments against the historical method are
arguments against the errors of practitioners and not against the method itself.
Good historians, as Barzun, Benjamin, Fischer, Bahn, Foucault and others have
explained, write history based on known facts, accepting the possibility that the
interpretation of those facts may change with the discovery of new facts. Also,
that such interpretation cannot and should not provide justifications for past
events based on present morality. And finally, good historians know that History,
as Science, is a living process, and even the best evidence of a period can be
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proven wrong or different with new findings. That awareness, instead of
weakening the method, constitutes its strongest characteristic.

Research purpose and justification
The purpose of this research is to explore the historical development and
importance of the ideological concept of right to know in EPCRA as an example
of the ―legislation for revelation‖ approach to public policy. Such an approach is
important to the study of Communication because the enforcement and success
of the right-to-know policies depend almost solely in the ability of the public to
receive, understand, process, use, and distribute information.
To achieve this purpose, this dissertation presents an historical a nalysis
based on primary sources of how the right-to-know principle was discussed and
included in the legislation as its main characteristic. This dissertation also
includes both legal and academic literature with the goal of revealing the
opportunities such laws as EPCRA present to communicators, especially in the
intersection of environmental and risk communication.
Therefore, this research aims to offer: 1) an accurate account of the
historical implementation of EPCRA focusing on the right-to-know principle it
bears; 2) a contextualization of the social-political environment surrounding
EPCRA‘s proposition and implementation; and 3) a critical insight into what
EPCRA represents to an open and democratic political process through the
perspective of environmental risk communication.
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The focus of this dissertation is the concept of the right to know in
EPCRA, a federal law with a well-defined scope of regulating information about
environmental risks involving the release of toxic and hazardous materials. The
appearance or mention of any other concept, event, movement, or law in this
dissertation has the sole purpose of providing context on the dissertation‘s topic.
To dwell on any other subject, concept, or law would be a n enterprise worthy of
many tomes, some of which have already been written and are cited in this
dissertation.
As such, any investigation of the history of state legislations and other
federal laws was avoided except as they were pertinent to the development of
the concept of right to know and/or an essential part of EPCRA‘s history.
Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this study to provide an in-depth legal
analysis of EPCRA as such analysis has been provided elsewhere extensively. 52
The methodological choice for this study was based on two core problems
linked to the research question: first, the need to fill the gap created by the
absence of a thorough historical account of this particular law and, second, the
importance of context in this analysis. History, as explained above, is the only
methodological approach that can both reveal the intrinsic details of a past event
52

Besides the various manuals and legal sources for the application of EPCRA, see: June C. Bolstridge.
EPCRA Data: A guide to the information on industrial facilities and chemical available under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992);
Shapiro, “Equity and Information”; Durham-Hammer, Kathryn E., 2004, “Left to Wonder: Reevaluating,
Reforming, and Implement ing the Emergency Planning and Co mmun ity Right -to-know Act of 1986,”
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 29: 323-357; Weeks, “The Bu mpy Road to Co mmun ity
Preparedness;” Green, Krista. “An Analysis of the Supreme Court‟s Resolution of the Emergency Planning
and Co mmunity Right-to-know Act Citizen Su it Debate.” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review 26, no. 387 (Winter, 1999); Dudley, Susan E. 2004. “It is Time to Reevaluate the Toxic Release
Inventory.” Missouri Environmental Law & Policy Review 12, no. 1.
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and expose the context in which it occurred based on documents, registries and
other primary sources produced at the time of the event.

Research question
What are the origins of the right-to-know principle in EPCRA and how was
it developed and discussed in the process of writing and imp lementing the law?

Methodological application and analysis
In order to answer the research question, a review of the academic,
scientific, and legal literature was conducted on EPCRA, right to know,
environmental justice, environmental communication, risk communication, risk
society, accidents involving the spill of toxic and hazardous materials, lawsuits
(especially the ones that reached the Supreme Court), community participation in
decision and policy making, environmental history, environmental sociology, and
environmental policy and law.
The second step was to look into official documents 53 on EPCRA‘s
implementation, the first writings about EPCRA during the process of its proposal
and after its adoption, and the legal and academic literature addressing EPCRA
since then. It is important to highlight that, during this process, the amount of
disagreement in the literature forced the researcher to take a deeper look into the
original writings of authors whose ideas were instrumental to the development of
a concept of right to know. The process resulted in so many findings that the
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researcher chose to make the origins of the right to know concept a separate
chapter from the literature review. A historiographic approach was applied to bot h
chapters 2 and 4. The historiographic work consisted of:
1) Identifying primary sources: First, the researcher used the citations in
the literature as a starting point. Also, the researcher made several searches in
Lexis Nexis (Academic, Congressional, and Environmental) in order to find news
and opinion articles, legal reviews, official records, and other documents. The
searches all used the ―all dates‖ parameters and used a combination of Boolean
term searches, like Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act;
EPCRA; right to kno w; right-to-know; toxic*; 54 hazardous*; community*; Toxic
Release Inventory; TRI; Florio; Superfund; SARA; Comprehensive Environmental
Resource, Compensation, and Liability Act; and CERCLA.
Second, once a document was located in a specific archive, the
researcher searched for a digital photographic copy or a reliable transcription of
that document. Reliability was determined by a triangulation of the text of the
document in different digital collections, especially if a copy was found in the
websites of the Library of Congress, the National Archives, or the original
newspaper of publication. Third, once a document was deemed reliable, it was
used to locate other documents on the same topic. A personal lette r from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison usually indicates if it was a response to a
query or if it requested a response from the other party, for example. Sometimes,
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a letter or document cited another letter or document. This process also added a
new layer to the reliability check as it confirmed the temporality of a document by
its mention in another document of the time. Finally, the last check was a
thorough reading of the documents in search for any idiosyncrasies in the
content of the documents with their related historical contexts. All documents and
letters cited in this dissertation passed all stages of this first step.
2) Contextualizing: The literature was conflicting about certain
generalizations, mostly due to different interpretations based o n the authors‘
diverse backgrounds (a lawyer would pay more attention to legal implications and
a sociologist to social ones) or different methodological approaches and
viewpoints. In order to recreate the historical context, the researcher went back
to the primary sources and tried to identify the events that were happening as the
authors of the original documents were writing to avoid temporal biases. Then,
the researcher followed the line of the discussion (letters and speeches usually
prompted responses) in other to establish not only the topic of discussion, but
also to understand the original authors‘ positions in relation to the topic. Finally,
by studying the biographies and expressed opinions of specific authors and
tracing them through time, the researcher could define a general idea of the
authors‘ views on specific topics related to this research.
3) Interpreting: Each document offered a clue to both its causality and its
intentionality, especially the transcriptions of the Congressional meetings about
the first Constitution of the United States, the deliberative open sessions about
the enactment of EPCRA to inform the letter of the law before its constituency,
29

and the writings of the Founding Fathers of the United States. During the
deliberative sessions about EPCRA, for example, different parties had the
chance to express their opinions on what and how they believed the legislation
should regulate. Those documents were essential in the appreciation of the
importance or irrelevance of interpretations offered after EPCRA‘s
implementation. They also made it possible to make comparisons with its
applications and effects based on the legal and scientific literature.
Based on the process of contextualization, the resulting interpretation of
the events and concepts were then contrasted with the interpretations of different
authors in the literature. Some of these contrasts were added to the text of the
dissertation in order to give the reader a fair comparison between two or more
interpretations.
4) Narrating: In chapter 2, the researcher opted for a historical narrative
style that allowed for revisionism as required by the conflicting literature. The
objective was to produce a logical sequence of facts and concepts that also
exposed the different views of other researchers about the same topic. In chapter
4, the historical narrative is less permissive as there are very few sources for
comparison. As this is an original attempt to provide a complete documental
history of the right to know principle in EPCRA, the scarcity of interpretations
about most of the facts and events forced the narrative into a more authoritative
tone. A list of documentation was added as an Appendix for ease of reference
rather than being mixed with the body of the dissertation where it would have
created pauses in the flow of the narrative.
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5) Limitations: For lack of travel funding, the search for primary sources
was limited to resources available online and at libraries in Knoxville, Tennessee.
However, thanks to digitization efforts of dozens of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, 55 pictures and transcriptions of almost all historical
documents and letters analyzed in this dissertation could be found. 56 However,
the fact that the documents used here were found does not account for
documents that might exist and could only be found by a physical examination of
private archives. That search will be the next step of this research, including oral
history interviews with people who have participated in the history of EPC RA who
are still alive. That step should add a better understanding of the intentions of
those participants and might result in revealing new sources of documents that
may shed light on more intimate and less public discussions about EPCRA and
the right to know. More than 5,000 letters, newspaper articles, official records,
and other documents 57 were reviewed for this study. Some details may have
been overlooked or documents missed altogether. If additional documents or
details are uncovered, they will be part of this project in the future.
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CHAPTER 2: THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A “RIGHT” TO KNOW
Liberty only flourishes where reason and knowledge are
encouraged; and wherever the latter are stifled, the former is
extinguished.
The Centinel (Samuel Bryan) 58
The right to know, as an idea and not a legal right, 59 evolved in two
distinct periods. In its pre-conceptual form, it was a right to be educated about
the purposes of government and to be informed about the actions of government
as formulated by John Milton, William Bollan, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine,
George Mason, John Wilson, and James Madison. In its contemporary
understanding, especially following Susan Hadden‘s definition, 60 the people‘s
right to know is a mechanism to empower people through education and
knowledge so they can watch over their governments and industries and improve
their lives. In this chapter, the ideological concept of a right to know will be
presented in a historiographic narrative of the academic literature and original
documentation of two distinct periods. The first part focuses on the
conceptualizations of a right to know from the period before the War for
Independence to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. The second presents the
evolution of the right to know in the American legislation from the publishing of
Harold Cross‘s The People’s Right to Know in 1953 to the implementation of
EPCRA.
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Westview Press, 1989).
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An instrumental right
Since the earliest debates on American independence and during the
period from the Articles of the Confederation to the enactment of the Bill of
Rights, the ideas of freedom and self-governance were in the forefront of the
revolutionary discussions. 61 Thomas Jefferson, drafter of the Declaration of
Independence, made part of the Declaration a list of accusations against King
George III of England. His accusations 62 negatively revealed the values that the
founders of the United States 63 considered to be moral inalienable rights of any
free American. Before listing what he believed were unacceptable crimes against
the American people, Jefferson laid out the basic characteristics of a free and
more democratic government system.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments
61

Rabban, Dav id M., “The Ahistorical Historian : Leonard Levy on Freedo m of Exp ression in Early
American History,” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 3 (Feb., 1985), 795-856.
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are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed 64

The ideas that the power of a government comes from the people and that
the role of government is to serve the people in their pursuit of freedom and
happiness were revolutionary in the times of monarchies. Especially insulting to a
monarch was the submission of government to the rule of the people. Many of
the rights Jefferson accused King George III of restricting were a direct reflection
on the belief this group of revolutionaries had on self-governance and economic
independence. 65 Among those rights, Kiul Uhm argued that the right to know can
be found in the text of the Declaration66 in which Jefferson accused King George
III of England of making it virtually impossible for the American people to find out
information about the British government‘s actions:
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public
Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance
with his measures. 67
Jefferson‘s words in the text of the Declaration may be interpreted by later
generations as reflecting the need for knowledge of the purposes of government
and accessible information about the acts of government for society to function. It
became a common theme in the colonies for people to be fined for not following
a new law that they never knew existed. Jefferson knew that, if a real democracy
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were to prevail in the newly formed United States of America, 68 the only way
people could retain such power was if society was informed about their choices
and took active part in the political process. 69
For Jefferson, the concept of a right to know was more than a simple right
to access information, but it included the right to be educated about the functions
of the government, so people (through the works of the p ress) could watch and
control the actions of government. In a letter to Edward Carrington in January,
1787, which became famous for Jefferson‘s remark that he would rather have
newspapers without government than the contrary, the underlying circumstances
of that choice are generally left out. 70 ―But I should mean that every man should
receive those papers, and be capable of reading them,‖ Jefferson wrote right
after the famous passage. In the letter, Jefferson explains his views:
I am persuaded myself that the good sense of the people will
always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a
moment, but will soon correct themselves. The people are the only
censors of their governors: and even their errors will tend to keep
these to the true principles of their institution. To punish these
errors too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of the
public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of
the people is to give them full information of their affairs thro‘ the
channel of the public papers, & to contrive that those papers should
68

Jefferson, differently fro m the majo rity of h is peers, believed in a liberal democratic system, which, later
on, became the basis for his Jeffersonian Democrat Party. Most of the others defended the creation of a
republic, but thought democracy as being the same as anarchy, as George Washington mentioned once
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penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our
governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment
to prefer the latter. 71

From the quote above, it seems that Jefferson believed at that time in
unrestricted disclosure as a form to keep the whole of the people informed about
public affairs. That mix of education and information was, according to Jefferson,
fundamental to protect the right he considered the most important of all, freedom
of opinion. Therefore, Jefferson believed that the right to a thoroughly informed
opinion was the very basis of a fair system and the only protection people have
against their governments. Almost in a prophetic passage, 72 Jefferson wrote:
Cherish therefore the spirit of our people, and keep alive their
attention. Do not be too severe upon their errors, but reclaim them
by enlightening them. If once they become inattentive to the public
affairs, you & I, & Congress & Assemblies, judges & governors
shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general
nature, in spite of individual exceptions; and experience declares
that man is the only animal which devours his own kind, for I can
apply no milder term to the governments of Europe, and to the
general prey of the rich on the poor. 73

Jefferson was not the first one to come up with such complex notion about
a right to knowledge and information. The idea that the decision-making process
should be carried out by informed citizens can be traced back to the ancient
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Greeks. Plato declared in The Republic that philosophers would be the best to
govern a republic as they were the most knowledgeable. Although, seemly an
elitist remark, Plato like his mentor, Socrates, and his pupil, Aristotle, believed
that education should be for all. 74 Euripides, the famed Athenian tragedian and
admirer of Socrates, wrote the verses that became inspirational to John Milton‘s
Areopagitica, enunciating the importance of the freedom of opinion in a
republican government:
This is true Liberty when free born men
Having to advise the public may speak free,
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise,
Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace
What can be juster in a State than this? 75
Euripides‘s words reflect his times as he denoted ―free born men‖ as not
including slaves and women. Milton himself is heralded as one of the first
defenders of a free press 76 in Western Europe, more than a thousand years after
Euripides, as Jefferey Smith wrote:
The idea of employing toleration and active participation in the
pursuit of truth was given no more lasting or deeply humanistic
expression in the seventeenth century than in Areopagitica, A
Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To
the Parliament of England.77
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In Areopagitica, Milton wrote: "Give me liberty to know, to utter, and to
argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties." 78 More than the
freedom of speech defended by Euripides, Milton expressly included the ―liberty
to know‖ in its defense of a free press; 79 words that would reverberate in the
minds of the authors behind the American Revolution more then two centuries
later. Smith lists a dozen of other authors that, in some level, linked freedom of
expression to the idea of educated citizenry between the 17 th and 18th
centuries. 80
In the period of the American and French revolutions, political activist,
pamphleteer, and inventor Thomas Paine 81 actively participated in both
revolutions and constantly wrote against the King of England and the monarchic
system. His pamphlet Common Sense, which he signed ―an Englishman,‖ sold
more than 100,000 copies, becoming the biggest bestseller in the 2 million-freecitizen colony. He saw little or no revenue from it. Paine‘s Common Sense was
the first direct attack on the King of England published during the run-up to the
78
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Declaration of Independence. However, more than a direct attack against the
English king, Common Sense was a reflection of Paine‘s democratic and liberal
thinking. 82 Even its style was accessible to the general public revealing Paine‘s
absolute distaste for elites and hierarchies, as historian Merrill Jensen 83 wrote:
Some newspaper writers had argued for independence at least as
early as 1773, but it was the publication of Common Sense on 9
January 1776 that set a ―terrible wordy war waging on the subject
of independence.‖ 84

Jensen continued:
The ideas in Common Sense were not new, for most of them had
appeared in dozens of newspapers and pamphlets. What was
different about Common Sense was its stirring prose, so unlike
most of the ponderous political writings of the times. 85
Paine‘s work was instrumental to the right to know concept as it fostered
the ideas of self-government and of republic (as ―thing belonging to the people‖).
Paine, like Jefferson, believed that society‘s power lay in the hands of the people
and therefore the public, and not a king, should be responsible for the decision
making. In such way, the public should be enlightened enough to do so. 86
A mix of antagonism against the tyrannical ways of the King of England
and all monarchies and praise for the virtues of a democratic republic based
82
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mostly on the writings of Milton and Locke, Common Sense quickly became a
bible for any American discontent with the British ruling. Common Sense is
above all a praise for self-governance and people‘s empowerment against
governments in general.
Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its
best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable
one: for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries BY A
GOVERNMENT, which we might expect in a country WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we
furnish the means by which we suffer. 87

Like Milton before him, Paine believed that an informed citizenry was the
best defense against an abusive government. In the ―Applying Principle to
Practice Preface‖ of the second edition of The Rights of Men, he wrote:
The defects of every government and constitution both as to
principle and form, must, on a parity of reasoning, be as open to
discussion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man
owes to society to point them out. When those defects, and the
means of remedying them, are generally seen by a nation, that
nation will reform its government or its constitution in the one case,
as the government repealed or reformed the law in the other. The
operation of government is restricted to the making and the
administering of laws; but it is to a nation that the right of forming or
reforming, generating or regenerating constitutions and
governments belong; and consequently those subjects, as subjects
of investigation, are always before a country as a matter of right,
and cannot, without invading the general rights of that country, be
made subjects for prosecution. 88

In this passage, Paine not only exalted the importance of openness in
government, he laid the foundation of the ideas of both freedom of speech as a
87
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―duty to point [the defects of government] out‖ and a right to form and reform the
acts of government, including the constitution of that government, without fearing
prosecution. These ideas, that the people will fix the problems of a nation through
the debate of ideas are also reflected in Jefferson‘s declarations as shown
earlier.
The right to know only appears in Paine‘s writings later in his life with The
Rights of Man as he participated actively in the preparation of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of Citizens by The National Assembly of France. In The
Rights of Man, he included the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which
brought a version of the right to know in one of its seventeen items: ―Fifteen:
Every community has a right to demand of all its agents an account of their
conduct.‖ For Paine, likewise for Jefferson, the right to know was an instrumental
right to secure all other rights. Both of them might have followed William Bollan‘s
idea of an instrumental right to free examination of public measures.
[T]he free examination of public measures, with a proper
representation by speech or writing of the sense resulting from that
examination, is the right of the members of a free state, and
requisite for the preservation of their other rights. 89
Referring to the right to know, Uhm said that ―eighteen-century Americans
clearly understood its conceptual implications for democratic republicanism.‖ 90
Although, Uhm‘s remark might be exaggerated, the letters from Jefferson,
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Madison, Mason, and Paine, are evidence that at least, some (very few probably)
knew in different levels the instrumental importance of a right to know. Other
historians have also identified the common belief among educated Americans of
the period of the American Revolution that an informed and educated citizenry
was necessary to support a legitimate government. 91
Paine shared with Jefferson the idea that a legitimate government draws
its power from the people. Only by consent of people properly educated on the
purposes of government and duly informed about government‘s actions could a
government avoid tyranny and amend errors. 92 Jefferson‘s concept of right to
know might not have been directly influenced by Paine, but the fact that their
friendship, mutual respect, common literary influences, and resonance of ideas
may indicate that, at least, some indirect inspiration might have taken place . 93
A more accepted influence for Jefferson‘s draft of the Declaration of
Independence came from Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George
Mason. 94 The similarities between Jefferson‘s and Mason‘s documents seem
evident from the first paragraph:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
91
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of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety. 95
The core idea of Mason‘s document is summarized in the second
paragraph: ―That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants and at all times
amenable to them.‖ 96 Mason‘s text would later become an obvious source for the
Bill of Rights, added to the Constitution on December 15, 1791, by ratification by
the states. 97
Mason, a participant in the Convention in Philadelphia refused to sign the
1787 Constitution because it lacked a Bill of Rights. His second major complaint
against the Constitutional Assembly was the lack of public access to its activities:
In the House of Representatives there is not the substance, but the
shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper
information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people.—
The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little concerned
in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences. 98

Finally, Mason accused the Assembly of not protecting the freedom of
press, among other fundamental rights. 99 For Mason, without the Bill of Rights
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and the formation of a formal constitutional council to inform and protect the
president from misinformation and alienation, the Constitution did nothing but
created a ―moderate aristocracy,‖ which he believed would end up becoming ―a
monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some
years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.‖ 100
This view was reflected by Jefferson‘s close friend and neighboring
planter, James Madison, who was to be the major force in proposing and drafting
the Bill of Rights urged in letters from Jefferson: 101
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives. 102
100
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Although Madison and Mason were foes during the preparation of the
Constitution, 103 both shared the idea that the public had a right to know about the
acts of government. During the Constitutional Convention, a few representatives
shared the idea that most of the rights later included in the Bill of Rights were
obvious assumptions of the new nation and there was no need to expressly write
them into the text of law as the power to constrain those rights was not given to
Congress or to the President. 104
The main concern for Madison was to get a Constitution ready and
approved as speedily as possible as he feared that any delays might completely
stop the creation of the new republic. The object of the Constitutional Convention
was a counter-revolution to create a national government. The Anti-Federalists
argued strenuously about the dangers of creating a Leviathan that would crush
liberties. The Federalists, with Madison in the lead, worked out a compromise to
promise a Bill of Rights so the states of Virginia and New York would ratify the
Constitution. Without those two states, the new Constitution would not have
worked. The government started in 1789 after the Constitution was ratified, but
the Federalist-ruled Congress only submitted the Bill of Rights to the states. On
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December 15, 1791, sufficient states had ratified to put the Bill of Rights into
effect.
Madison was not blind to the people‘s right to know. Together with John
Rutledge, Madison tried to require that each House would keep a journal of its
proceedings, which should be published from time to time. 105 The rejection of
Madison and Rutledge‘s motion ended up becoming the spark that caused
James Wilson to expressly defend the right to know: ―The people have a right to
know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the
opinion of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.‖ 106 Mason added that an
explicitly written requirement would give the people ―a just alarm‖ of the abuse
and a basis to ―make a conclave of their Legislature.‖ 107
Although the right to know was expressly included neither in the
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights, it became a pillar in the defense of openness
in government and of democratic processes in the American society. 108 Uhm
declared that the idea of the right to know was not only present, but was part of
the daily discussions among the Founding Fathers of the United States and the

105

Although this was a minor move by Madison, it reflected his understanding of keeping the public
informed about the actions of government in a s mall level. He later expanded his defense of the right to
know, see note 101.
106
James Wilson. “Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention, 1787” In Collected Works of
James Wilson, edited by Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, with an Introduction by Kermit L. Hall , and
a Bibliographical Essay by Mark David Hall, collected by Maynard Garrison (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2007). Vo l. 1. The Online Library of Liberty.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2072&chapter=156340&layo
ut=html&Itemid=27 (accessed February 6, 2009).
107
Uh m. “The Founders,” 398.
108
Uh m cites both Federalists and Anti-Federalists writings in the defense of the public‟s right to know and
against government secrecy, which was only tolerated in case of sensitive military informat ion about the
movement of troops or in the negotiation of international treat ises that might endanger the standing of the
nation with other countries. Uh m. “The Founders.”

46

framers of the American Constitution. Again, this might be an overstatement, but
both personal letters and journal articles seem to show that the topic was present
at the time, just neither on a daily basis nor widespread. 109
Authors, activists, and/or politicians like Paine, Jefferson, Wilson,
Madison, and even Anti-Federalists like Mason, ―The Centinel‖ (Samuel Bryan),
―Cato,‖ (probably Governor George Clinton) and the ―Federal Farmer‖ (Richard
Henry Lee) all shared an understanding of a concept of right to know not only as
a right to access information from the government, but as a right to be educated
about the purposes of government and its activities in order to make educated
and informed judgments about their own lives and their futures. They might not
have understood a right to know in anything like a 21st century sense. 110 Yet
words can take on a life of their own.
It was the slaveholder Jefferson who wrote ―all men are created equal‖ in
the Declaration of Independence. From the advocacy of people building a
revolution, an imperative for citizens to know more fully about the meetings and
decisions of government bodies surfaced. The language sometimes used was
not inconsistent with a more modern concept of ―right to know.‖ Perhaps a broad
theory of a right to know may have been emerging as long ago as the War for
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution and, two years later, of the
Bill of Rights.
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Unfortunately, there isn‘t much evidence of any formal discussions
about the right to know between the period after the death of James Madison and
the end of World War II. It is possible that after losing the battle for its inclusion in
the Bill and the death of the most prominent defenders of the right to know, the
debate simply turned to other issues. The modern right-to-know movement came
as a backlash against the growth of the American security state after World War
II, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

The Right to Know and American Freedom of Information: Agitation and
Legislation of the 1950s and 1960s
Before EPCRA, the first attempts to establish a right to know came from a
few legal scholars and from journalists, notably from Sigma Delta Chi (precursor
of the Society of Professional Journalists) during the 1950s. Harold Cross, a
retired attorney for a newspaper, made the term ―right to know‖ popular with the
publication of The Public’s Right to Know, in which he wrote his findings in a
study of access to government information, focusing especially on the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 for the American Society of
Newspapers Editors. Section 3 of APA made some matters of official record
available to ―persons properly and directly concerned.‖ 111 However, Cross found
that the vague text of the law and the poorly defined exemptio ns were used by
agencies to deny access to information and not to make it available. 112 Cross‘s
findings prompted a series of analyses and essays on the right to know,
111
112

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 3, 5 U.S.C. 1002.
Haro ld Cross, The Public’s Right to Know (New York, Basic Books, 1953).

48

especially on the 11 years of hearings for the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA), an amendment to APA signed by President Lyndon Johnson. Wallace
Parks described the political climate on the access to go vernmental information
during that decade:
The withholding of government information is currently a subject of
general interest and considerable controversy in the United States.
In spite of the vast volume of government publications and releases
of various types, many skilled observers of American governmental
processes have become concerned, since the end of World War II,
because of suppression, withholding, or delayed availability of
information at its source. Both major parties in recent platforms
have promised to free government information pertaining to the
national government. 113

Parks also listed the main complaints of journalists and difficulties faced
by the public, even legislators, while trying to get access to governmental
activities:
Among the conditions which have been alleged and criticized are
the following: (1) records, background reports, and proceedings
frequently are not available or open to the press, interested parties,
specialists, or to the Members and Committees of the Congress; (2)
many officials are not responsive when questions are put to them
even by legislators; (3) a growing trend to release information only
through high agency officials; (4) many releases and publications
are inadequate, tardy, slanted, politically motivated, or paternalistic
- including reports required by law to be submitted to the Congress;
(5) much vital information has been classified or refused release
under security regulations which is readily available to potential
enemies or of little if any security importance; (6) indirect
restrictions are applied to scientific, press, and other
communications outside the government. 114
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Under protests from journalists and the general public, the House
Committee on Government Operations created a subcommittee on go vernment
information under the direction of John Moss in 1955. Robert Blanchard argued
that the 173 hearings under the Moss established the foundations for a new
information policy, although the amendments to APA recommended by Moss‘s
subcommittee were repeatedly thwarted by a lack of interest by the Judiciary
Committee that oversaw Moss‘s subcommittee. 115
During that period authors generally argued for the right to access
governmental information, but a few were more specific. Leon R. Yankwich
argued for an ethical approach to the democratic system based on the idea of
responsibility. 116 After arguing for a ―qualified privilege‖ for reporters of
governmental activities, Yankwich justified the right to know as instrumental for
the watchdog function of the press. He wrote:
In brief, if public officials and the organs of information act with full
awareness of their moral obligation and responsibility to a
democratic society, they will perform truly their essential function as
instruments of free government. 117

Parks followed Yankwich, adding that secrecy should only be applied to
very special cases and that openness should be the rule:
From the standpoint of the principles of good government under
accepted American political ideas, there can be little question but
that open government and information availability should be the
general rule from which exceptions should be made only where
115
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there are substantial rights, interests, and considerations requiring
secrecy or confidentiality and these are held by competent authority
to overbalance the general public interest in openness and
availability. 118
Parks also argued that the right to know had constitutional standing 119 as
the Ninth Amendment protected other rights not expressly protected in the
Constitution and that those rights could have equal standing as the enumerated
rights. Moreover, he argued that an interpretation of the First Amendment
through the words of James Madison and some Supreme Court rulings gave the
right to know a very important constitutional standing as it was fundamental to
secure other rights:
It is clear that the primary purpose of the freedom-of-speech and
press clause of the First Amendment was to prevent the
government from interfering with the communication of facts and
views about governmental affairs, in order that all could properly
exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a free
society. This clause was intended as one of the guarantees of the
people's right to know. Its pivotal importance to other freedoms was
recognized clearly. In Madison's words, "... the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication thereon, is the only effective guardian of every
other right." The Supreme Court has recognized this connection
repeatedly. 120
118
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Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., a U.S. Senator from Missouri at the time,
became more successful in the Senate than Moss had been in the House.
Heading the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Hennings proposed
amendments to APA that were finally approved and signed by President Dwight
D. Eisenhower. Nonetheless, Hennings was surprised by the president‘s
discourse, safeguarding his own right to withhold information at the moment of
signing of the bill that would become the Freedom of Information Act seven years
later. Hennings wrote a cautionary article 121 making a case that the Executive
Privilege to withhold information only applies in cases of ―clear and present
danger‖ to national security. 122
The Freedom of Information Act was the first statutory regulation that
included a right-to-know instrument. However, as legal scholar Joseph D.
Jacobson noted, the FOIA was ―a broader effort to establish a statutory right to
access government information‖ 123 and did not include any provisions for the
government (or corporations) to proactively inform the public about its activities.
Although the FOIA was modified and amended several times throughout
the years, the right in the FOIA is only for the public to be able to gain access to

In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it
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information upon request. 124 In the FOIA, concerned citizens needed first to
know what information they were looking for and what government agency held
that information. That arrangement, although of crucial importance, served only
for a reactive/retrospective process and did not fit the notion of right to know as a
right to be informed and knowledgeable about the purposes and actions of
government, as contended by Jefferson and Madison. The right to know, as they
envisioned and was much later defined by Susan Hadden, 125 should help inform
and educate the public about the activities of government so the public can
choose among options or even inform the decision makers about new options.
Three years after of the enactment of FOIA, another statute carrying a
different version of the right to know was enacted as a direct consequence of the
efforts of the Environmental Movement: the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1969. However, the right to know in NEPA, like in FOIA, was still not
fully developed.
[W]hile NEPA was certainly a groundbreaking statute in the broad
public ―right-to-participate‖ sense, it does not clearly fit into the
narrower ―right-to-know‖ category which is more often thought of as
a scheme in which polluters are required to disclose their
processes and other information. The first true right-to-know
provision in a substantive environmental statute would not become
law until 1986. 126
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However, in 1977 David Michael Ivester recharged the discussion on the
right to know in his article ―The Constitutional Right to Know.‖ 127 Ivester started
out with a powerful claim of the indispensability of a right to know:
Indispensable to the continued success of our two hundred year old
experiment in self-government is a free flow of information upon
which individuals can make reasoned judgments. In any political
system, those who make the decisions must have access to
information upon which to base their decisions. Although pure
democracy and an absolutely free flow of information are difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve, the practical relationship between the
two nevertheless remains unchanged. To the extent that a system
shares responsibility for decisionmaking, information must also be
shared. 128

Ivester proceeded to argue for the constitutionality of the right to know.
According to Ivester, it was, at least in part, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights to secure the right to know, especially through
the First Amendment.
Although the quest for the intent of the framers is fraught with
perils, it can reasonably be said that some recognition and
protection of the right to know was contemplated or presumed by
many of those who participated in the process of producing the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Indeed there is some evidence
suggesting that the Founding Fathers intended to guarantee the
right to know per se, that is, that the First Amendment was
specifically intended to extend to the people a directly enforceable
right to know about governmental affairs. 129

Ivester then argued about the instrumentality of the right to know in the
framers‘ intent:
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If, perhaps, this specific intent did not enter the minds of most of the
framers, there is persuasive evidence, in light of the widespread
awareness of the basic need for ―popular information, or the means
of acquiring it,‖ that the freedom of speech and press clauses were
intended at least as instrumental means of securing and protecting
the right to know. In other words, assuming the framers had no
intent to create a directly enforceable right to know, they expected
that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press would
effectively secure the right of the people to know about their
government. 130
Ivester‘s article can be seen as another attempt to prevent the idea of a
right to know from succumbing to government secrecy, but it also reflected the
struggles of the late 1970s on government secrecy, especially after Jim Carter
became president with a more liberal platform than his predecessor Gerald Ford,
as chapter 4 reveals. The idea of a right to know before EPCRA was no more
than an ideological concept despite the repeated claims of some scholars as
Eugenia Zerbinos argued: ―The claims by Parks, Emerson and Ivester of a right
to know do not withstand analysis within the rights schema.‖ 131 The right to know
had no recognized legal or constitutional support.
As Jacobson pointed out, it was only with EPCRA, that the right to know—
the right of people to be informed on issues pertaining to their lives, livelihood,
and public policy in order to fully participate in the decision-making process—was
finally expressly written into the text of law. 132 As seen in this chapter, the right to
know carried a series of assumptions and ideas throughout its history. The main
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characteristics found in the literature of the different periods defines the right to
know as an instrumental right of citizens to know about their government and
their government‘s actions in order to secure all other rights. This concept was
derived from the principles of self-governance, sovereignty of the people, and
freedom of expression.
The ideological concept of the right to know, although defended by
different people at different times, has never been fully recognized by the
Supreme Court or clearly stated in a federal law until EPCRA. It‘s important to
highlight both the preventive and participatory characteristics of the right to know
in EPCRA as they represent a true step to empower citizens to act directly in the
policymaking process and take part in the decision making. Thus they
differentiate EPCRA from previous laws, like the Freedom of Information Act, that
brought a right to petition the government for information, but not a right to know
with the preventive and participatory characteristics.
Furthermore, EPCRA also included private corporations into the mix of
entities that needed to make the information available, recognizing them as part
of the group of institutions that directly affected the public interest and, therefore,
needed to provide checks and balances on the activities that put public health at
risk.
The next chapter will take a look into the history of the social movements
that helped make EPCRA become a reality.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
The principles of the public‘s right to know, self-governance, and
community involvement may constitute the core of EPCRA, but EPCRA‘s
adoption was firmly grounded in actual historic events as much as in ideological
principles. In order to contextualize the events that led to EPCRA‘s proposal and
signing into law, this chapter will present a literature review of some of the ideas,
theories, academic discussions, and historical antecedents focusing on the
environment, the movements and events that preceded EPCRA.
The main point of this chapter is to clarify some of the underlying contexts
that allowed EPCRA to become a different kind of approach to policy making by
creating communication opportunities based on the right to know. The chapter
starts with a brief description of the theoretical interpretation of the events seen in
the 20th century through Ulrich Beck‘s Risk Society. The concept put forward by
Beck is important to this analysis mainly because it became a highly mentioned
theoretical framework among environmental justice scholars . It provided a
justification that addressed much of the needs of the Environmental Justice
Movement. Beck was not the first to work with the idea of risk, but for scholars
like Robert Bullard, Robert Brulle, and David Golblatt, he was the first one to use
the idea of environmental risk as the central characteristic to create an analytical
framework of the late 20th century and early 21st century society, replacing other
vastly used concepts like ―production‖ and ―consumption.‖
Beck‘s work also provided a justification for community participation as he
wrote that self-governance and community-based decision making would be the
57

best way to deal with the sheer amount of risks produced in the late 20 th and
early 21st century society. Beck‘s theory focused on the transformation of the
production society created by Modernity after the industrial revolutions into a
―risk‖ society because of the consequences of large-scale production finally
accumulated to a point in which the generated risks could not be igno red or
hidden any longer. The main problem, according to Beck, is that the
governmental apparatuses are insufficient to regulate, oversee, investigate, and
enforce the enormous amount of risks generated by the production society. In
consequence, citizens needed to get organized and empowered to do what the
State could not. 133
For some environmental justice and environmental sociology scholars, the
births of the anti-toxic and the Environmental Justice Movements, as well as the
resurgence of a reconfigured environmental movement in the second half of the
20th century, are reflections and evidence of what Beck described. In chapter 4
and 5 of this dissertation, EPCRA‘s history seems to exemplify what Anthony
Giddens called ―reflexive society.‖ 134 As society is forced to deal with the
consequences of the ―industrial society,‖ it creates new institutions to oversee the
workings of the failing governmental institutions. For Beck, these new institutions
are grassroots groups, citizens‘ organizations, and communities‘ associations. 135
As such, Beck‘s analysis of society fits well with the intent of
environmental and environmental justice groups. These, in turn, will constitute
133
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the main source of pressure on governmental agencies and private corporations
to diminish the indiscriminate use and release of toxic and hazardous substances
into the environment as shown both in his chapter and in chapter 4. After a
series of accidents and the discovery that even common industrial practices
might have been contaminating entire communities, common citizens started to
organize against corporate practice.136 However, the first step—and what
became a seminal characteristic of theses movements—was to find out what
kind of materials industrial facilities were using and releasing into the
environment and what kind of risk they represented. These movements claimed,
above all, that communities had a right to know what chemicals and materials
were being released into their water, air, and soil. 137
On the theoretical side, the struggle for the right to know also found a
home in two approaches to communication: environmental communication and
risk communication. Historically, environmental communication began evolving
from nature writing and later from the needs of the conservation and
environmental movements to understand the role of media and corporate
messages and to create their own. Academically, the field of environmental
communication as a legitimate academic field started with Christine Oravec‘s
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work on John Muir‘s rhetoric, 138 although some other sociological and literary
approaches to environmental writing and communication practice have been tried
before. 139
Although the practice of risk communication can be traced to ancient
times, the study of risk communication as an academic field, especially on
environmental issues as pertained to the topic of this dissertation, came with the
necessity of corporations to prepare for the impact of environmental disasters
caused by their industrial plants. Although risk communication encompasses an
extremely large field of research, as does environmental communication, this
research will focus on the writings and understandings that are more directly
related to the study of environmental risks involving toxic and hazardous
materials and community empowerment and participation.

The risk society
Humans differ from brute action, too, in its influence upon the
material world, because it is not controlled by natural
compensations and balances. Natural arrangements, once
disturbed by man, are not restored until he retires from the field,
and leaves free scope to spontaneous recuperative energies; the
wounds he inflicts upon the material creation are not healed until he
withdraws the arm that gave the blow.
George Perkins Marsh140
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In the sociological tradition, the idea of risk as the center of human society
(as opposed to production or consumption, for example) comes mostly after
Beck‘s work about a change of societal structures, evolving from the notion of
industrial society to risk society. In 1986 Beck published Risikogesellschaft - Auf
dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, translated to English six years later as Risk
Society. In it, Beck 141 portrayed a constantly changing world in its process of
modernization and free of the traditional gridlocks of the industrial society. Beck‘s
thesis was that society was ―witnessing not the end but the beginning of
modernity – that is, of modernity beyond its classical industrial design.‖ 142 For
Beck, that new stage of modernity will be what Beck called reflexive
modernization, one of his central theories: ―The argument is that, while in
classical industrial society the ―logic‖ of wealth production dominates the ―logic‖
of risk production, in the risk society this relationship is reversed.‖ 143
Beck contended that the risks and consequences of modernization were
―irreversible threats to the life of plants, animals, and human beings.‖ 144 Although
many other authors, like Rachel Carson 145 for example, identified environmental
problems as a serious threat to society, Beck‘s work created a new lens for the
141
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social sciences to study the concept of environmental risk as the central focus of
analysis, replacing the role of social institutions. Beck also proposed that, with
the failure of social institutions to deal with the broad concept of risk, society
would need to turn more and more to civic participation and self-governance in all
stages of government and society. For Beck, only through the inclusion of the
public in the decision-making process would governments be able to prevent and
ameliorate environmental problems. He also defended the concept that wellinformed local communities would be more able to monitor and react to local
risks.146
For David Goldblatt 147 the distinguishing feature of Beck‘s work was
to place the origins and consequences of environmental
degradation right at the heart of a theory of modern society, rather
than seeing it as a peripheral element or theoretical afterthought.
Beck‘s sociology and the societies it describes are dominated by
the existence of environmental threats and the ways we understand
and respond to them. 148
Golblatt 149 wrote that the ideas of risks and hazards in Beck‘s work were
most closely examined in the equation with environmental degradation and, citing
Anthony Giddens, differentiated risk from danger explaining that what transforms
dangers and hazards into risks is that they are known, predictable and whose
likelihood that can be calculated.
To be in danger is one thing. To know that one is in danger is quite
another. To know that one is in danger and to feel essentially
powerless to alter the course of events which generate that danger
146
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is another again. Alongside the shift from danger to risk,
contemporary environmental problems possess further distinctive
characteristics which elicit and demand very particular patterns of
political and psychological response. These demands and
responses are of such magnitude that their emergence can be said
to herald the emergence of a distinctive form of modernity. 150

In that way, Beck presented three arguments explaining different features
of modern environmental risks. First, differently from the past, contemporary
hazards are not limited in their effects by spatial or social limitations. The second
argument describes the catastrophic and even total annihilating effects of largescale nuclear and chemical accidents and of the genetic manipulation of the
planet‘s fauna and flora. Finally, the last argument explained that the point of
impact of modern environmental risks ―is not obviously tied to their point of origin
and that their transmission and movements are often invisible and untrackable to
everyday perception.‖ 151
According to Beck, the critique of the scientific de velopment in a reflexive
examination belongs in the public sphere, 152 putting the lay public and the
scientists at the same level of importance in the political process. 153
Environmental sociologist Eugene A. Rosa 154 wrote that Anthony
Giddens‘s and Ulrich Beck‘s theories on modernization and risk society should
be considered ―theories of society and environment‖ because of the present
150
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concern for hazards in the contemporary world and over the vulnerability of the
environment. For Rosa, risk is a ―valuable analytic lens for evaluating past and
future impacts of humans on the environment.‖ 155

The Environmental Justice Movement and the road to EPCRA
Then a strange blight crept over the area and everything began to
change. Some evil spell had settled on the community: mysterious
maladies swept the flocks of chickens; the cattle and sheep
sickened and died. Everywhere was a shadow of death. The
farmers spoke of much illness among their families. In the town the
doctors had become more and more puzzled by new kinds of
sickness appearing among their patients. There had been several
sudden and unexplained deaths, not only among adults but even
among children, who would be stricken suddenly while at play and
die within hours.
Rachel Carson156

The origins of the U. S. environmental movement as a political action can
be tracked back to September 30, 1847, when U.S. Congressman George
Perkins Marsh stood up before the Agricultural Society of Rutland County,
Vermont to deliver a speech that would become seminal for the Conservation
Movement on the necessity of protecting American wildlife and vegetation. 157
Such ideas gained strength prior to World War I with the formation of John
Muir‘s Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, but primarily with the
adoption of conservation ideals by the General Federation of Women‘s Clubs,
which worked as the main engine of information dissemination. The GFWC
155
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counted with more than one million members in 1900 and created a
communication network never seen before at that time. A good part of Muir‘s
success, for example, depended on the efficiency of the GFWC in passing along
sensitive information and exerting influence in key political figures. 158
Jack E. Davis, in an article about Marjory Stoneman Douglas, a most
influential woman environmentalist, wrote:
Many women's organizations, particularly the more influential white,
middle- to upper-class groups, integrated social concerns—child
welfare, school reform, and pure-food regulations—with
conservation agendas. The national General Federation of
Women's Clubs (GFWC) maintained a conservation department,
and among its lobbying accomplishments were state and national
laws to protect forests, waters, and wildlife. Gifford Pinchot, whose
mother chaired the conservation committee of the Daughters of
American Revolution, observed in 1910 that "few people realize
what women have already done for conservation." 159

The Conservation Movement became one of the first movements to
present characteristics that would only appear in the second half of the 20th
century as it linked environmental issues to the fight for civil rights, particularly
the inclusion of women and African-descendents into the public life. However,
first economic problems of the Great Depression of 1929, and then the all-out
defense efforts of World War II submerged the Conservation Movement, with
wartime concerns becoming more important tha n conservation, or for that matter,
civil rights, social welfare, and public health.
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Despite the fact that by 1958 every American state had discovered cases
of toxic contamination of ground water, 160 it was only in 1962, with Rachel
Carson‘s book Silent Spring, that environment and public health were stirred
together once again. Carson‘s book resuscitated the discussion about
environmental degradation by showing how human actions can have a ―domino
effect‖ on nature. Carson showed how the use of DDT and other chemicals
caused the contamination of U.S. waters. The poison was then absorbed by
plankton and spread upward and with increasing concentration through the food
chain back to human consumption causing a variety of deadly diseases. 161 Silent
Spring was the seed for the grassroots effort that later included the Anti-toxic
Movement, one of the most effective sides of the new and reconfigured
environmental movement. 162
The Anti-toxic Movement helped increase the public outcry for regulations
on the use of toxic and hazardous materials by industry and became instrumental
(although not alone) in the creation of a series of laws and regulations—among
them the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substance Control
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act 163—and even
the birth of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. 164 In the end of
160
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the 1970s and early 1980s, a series of events put together environmental
concerns, civil rights and social justice concepts that became known simply as
environmental justice. 165
Initially, what is known now as the Environmental Justice Movement was
actually a myriad of different smaller movements, like the Anti-toxic Movement, a
few Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) actions, and the People of Color
Environmental Movement. Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson referred to a
visit by the reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. to Memphis in 1968 ―on an
environmental and economic justice mission for the striking Black garbage
workers,‖ who were demanding equal pay and better working conditions as a first
step for the Environmental Justice Movement. 166
The Environmental Justice Movement began to emerge from geographic
areas that were primarily populated by people of color or lower economic status
that had been affected by air, water, and soil pollution. 167 The Environmental
Justice Movement became an umbrella term to unify hundreds of different local
struggles against low environmental standards from companies and local
governments. These sometimes organized groups aimed to force corporations
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and governments to clean up and compensate local communities for the spill of
toxic chemicals in the soil, water, and air, and to impede the allocation of highrisk industrial plants in ethnic or poor neighborhoods among other things. Luke
Cole and Sheila Foster wrote about the difficulties of pinpointing a specific origin
for the movement:
Pointing to a particular date or event that launched the
Environmental Justice Movement is impossible, as the movement
grew organically out of dozens, even hundreds, of local struggles
and events and out of a variety of other social movements.
Nevertheless, certain incidents loom large in the history of the
movement as galvanizing events. 168
Sherry Cable and Charles Cable169 identified three social forces in the
1980s that promoted the perception of race and class injustice among the
working class. First, the disasters of Love Canal and Three Mile Island
exemplified the failure of governmental institutions by exposing how those
institutions served class interests. The second was the environmental
deregulation of the Reagan Administration. The third was the trickle-down
environmental grievances revealed through the discoveries of more
contaminated communities. 170
The community of Love Canal, New York, was poisoned by 248 separate
chemicals at the end of the 1970s, including 130 pounds of dioxin, one of the
most toxic substances known to science according to an EPA/National Research
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Council Report. 171 ―Quite simply, Love Canal is one of the most appalling
environmental tragedies in American history,‖ wrote Eckardt C. Beck,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency during the Love Canal
crisis for the EPA Journal at the time.
But this is not really where the story ends. Quite the contrary.
We suspect that there are hundreds of such chemical dumpsites
across this Nation.
Unlike Love Canal, few are situated so close to human settlements.
But without a doubt, many of these old dumpsites are time bombs
with burning fuses -- their contents slowly leaching out. And the
next victim could be a water supply, or a sensitive wetland.
The presence of various types of toxic substances in our
environment has become increasingly widespread -- a fact that
President Carter has called "one of the grimmest discoveries of the
modern era."
Chemical sales in the United States now exceed a mind-boggling
$112 billion per year, with as many as 70,000 chemical substances
in commerce. Love Canal can now be added to a growing list of
environmental disasters involving toxics, ranging from industrial
workers stricken by nervous disorders and cancers to the discovery
of toxic materials in the milk of nursing mothers. 172

Love Canal was one of the most reported cases of toxic disaster in the
U.S., but was small in numbers of victims when compared to previous disasters
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like the Donora Smog i n Monongahela River Valley in Pennsylvania in 1948 173 or
the Buffalo Creek Hollow disaster in 1972. 174 However, because of the Love
Canal Homeowner Association (LCHA) refusal to accept the condescending
attitude from the authorities by hiring their own experts to track down health
problems associated with the toxic dumping, 800 people ended up being
evacuated permanently from the area. The LCHA‘s battle became a media
phenomenon and pressured the federal government to enact the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), or
Superfund Law. 175
Bullard and Johnson identified a waste dispute in Houston, Texas, which
resulted in the landmark lawsuit Bean vs. South western Waste Management Inc.
of 1979 as the precursor event of the fight against environmental racism. 176
Margaret Bean and other Houston residents sued Southwestern Waste
Management to stop the creation of a landfill in an almost exclusively AfricanAmerican neighborhood. The company won the lawsuit as the plaintiffs failed to
prove the company‘s intent to discriminate. However, a struggle against the
construction of a hazardous waste landfill in Warren County, North Carolina in
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1982 is considered the official birth of the Environmental Justice Movement,
according to Eileen Maura McGurty, Robert D. Bullard and others. 177 ―The
protests marked the first time African Americans had mobilized a national broad based group to oppose what they defined as environmental racism,‖ Bullard
wrote. 178 Nevertheless, despite a six-week protest with the participation of nearly
500 people, the landfill was constructed. For McGurty, the reason the protest in
Warren County is still considered the birth of the Environmental Justice
Movement despite older events was the presence of the four factors determined
by Sidney Tarrow: cultural frames, social networks, disruptive action, and political
opportunities. 179
In Warren County all of these requirements were met and the
development of a new social movement was possible. First,
environmental racism was the collective action frame with its
unique diagnosis, attribution of blame, and proposed solutions.
Second, informal associations, connected to the civil rights
movement, had receded into daily life and were now ready to
emerge with this new opportunity. Third, the disruptive action in
Warren County followed closely the repertoire established by civil
rights activism several decades earlier and was well known by
participants, bystanders, and authorities. The organizers were also
able to modify it slightly to create significant disorder. Lastly,
political opportunities were ripe: Hazardous waste reforms created
an atmosphere for extensive environmental reforms; changes in
environmental legislation had enabled citizens to influence
environmental decision making; shifts in African-American electoral
politics also opened the field for action. 180
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As seen before, Cole and Foster explained the foundations for the
Environmental Justice Movement as a mix of influences from the Civil Rights
Movement, Anti-toxics Movement (now called the Environmental Health
Movement), Native American struggles, the Labor Movement, traditional
environmentalists, academics, and earlier environmental justice (against racism)
activists. 181
The Environmental Justice Movement differs from the larger
environmental movement that had been active in the United States since the late
1800s.182 Changing the locus of the environmental struggle from the wilderness
to populated areas, the Environmental Justice Movement worked from the
grassroots level to include ―where people live, work, play, go to school, as well as
how these things interact with the physical and natural worlds.‖ 183 The
Environmental Justice Movement was born as a ―political response to the
deterioration of the conditions of everyday life as society reinforces social
inequalities‖ and has sought to ―redefine environmentalism as much more
integrated with social needs of human populations.‖ 184 The Environmental Justice
Movement was a loose alliance of grassroots efforts that emerged as a response
to the environmental paradigm in place before the 1970s in order to challenge
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perceived practices, policies, and conditions that are felt to be unfair, unjust, or
outright illegal. 185
The efforts of all the movements and actions under the umbrella of the
Environmental Justice Movement became the main source of political pressure
that ended up in the creation of laws related to toxic substances, like CERCLA in
1980, and, in 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA).186

Relating environmental justice and environmental risk communication
Beyond EPCRA and the right to know, the concept of environmental
justice is also an important part of the environmental risk communication
model. 187 Among the most important issues in contemporary environmental and
risk communication, environmental justice addresses perceived race and class
inequities in the distribution of environmental risks. The Environmental Protection
Agency defined environmental justice as
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. … It will be achieved
when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from
environmental and health hazards and equal access to the
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decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to
live, learn, and work. 188
Andy Gouldson189 examined the relationships between corporate social
responsibility and environmental justice. Using data collected from 2003 to 2005
on oil refineries in the European Union and the United States, the study
concentrated on three basic areas: 1) a qualitative evaluation of corporate social
responsibility policies of nine petroleum-based companies; 2) a quantitative
report on site-level practices of environmental performance of refineries in the
European Union and the United States; and 3) a quantitative description of
variances in environmental performance of refineries in relation to the principles
of environmental justice.
The findings in the first area showed that the three largest companies had
better corporate social responsibility policies than did the smaller firms in the
survey. More importantly, at the local level, there were correlations between
refineries with higher levels of emissions and refineries in lower levels of income,
employment, and population density. Gouldson‘s correlation did not show a
historical causality; Gouldson could not prove or disprove that refineries were
being placed in certain areas because they were lower income areas. Over and
over, scientific reports 190 showed that there is both a correlation between the
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allocation of pollutant facilities in ethnic and/or lower-income areas and the
development of ethnic and/or lower-income neighborhoods around such facilities
due to lower property prices.
Overall, organized concern about environmental justice not only led to the
enactment of EPCRA, as will be demonstrated on chapter 4, it is also a
fundamental concept in the discussion about community right to know and
effective and informed risk decisions Environmental justice is, in itself, an
expected outcome of the law. 191

Environmental and risk communication
Community residents who live near or work at manufacturing facilities that
produce potentially hazardous and toxic materials are sensitive to the fairness
and equity of risk distribution and to the resulting environmental and aesthetic
implications of activities of such facilities. 192 The perception of risk or fair
allocation of risk is among the numerous motivators people use when deciding
whether a problem exists and deserves their attention. Once in the face of a risk
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situation, people may opt to make personal responses or to collaboratively seek
collective solutions by engaging in public policy struggles. 193 This carries two
core concerns of both environmental and risk communication: the existence of
real risk or actual problem and the public perception about them, which may
empower or discourage communities to act. Below the concepts and
applications of environmental communication and risk communication will be
explored under the framework provided by the concepts of risk society and
environmental justice.

Environmental communication
Environmental communication encompasses various different practical
and theoretical instances and approaches. It can relate to the work of activists
and advocates, regulators, journalists, community organizations, and
corporations. For each practice, environmental communication may have
different specific purposes, like education, persuasion, information, regulation,
etc. Moreover, environmental communication can be studied from a variety of
perspectives, such as mass communications, rhetoric, advocacy campaigns and
lobbying, marketing, advertising, popular culture, literature, social movements,
interpersonal communication, organizational communication, etc. 194
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Environmental communication is a field within the communication
discipline, as well as a metafield that cuts across disciplines.
Research and theory within the field is united by the topical focus
on communication and human relations with the environment.
Scholars who study environmental communication are particularly
concerned with the ways people communicate about the natural
world because they believe that such communication has far
reaching effects at a time of largely human-caused environmental
crises.195

The challenge to define environmental communication is certainly as
complex as the diversity of topics, objectives, and approaches used in the field.
Robert Cox196 presented an ―informal‖ and a formal definition for the field.
Informally, Cox saw environmental communication as a
study of the ways in which we communicate about the environment,
the effects of this communication on our perceptions of both the
environment and ourselves, and therefore on our relationship with
the natural world. 197

In his formal definition, Cox approached the subject from both symbolicinteractionist and social-constructivist perspectives and pointed out two main
distinct functions of environmental communication: one based on practice and
the other as formative of people‘s perception and knowledge:
I use environmental communication to mean the pragmatic and
constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as
well as our relationships to the natural world; it is the symbolic
medium that we use in constructing environmental problems and
negotiating society‘s different responses to them. 198
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In its pragmatic function, environmental communication ―educates, alerts,
persuades, mobilizes, and helps us to solve environmental problems.‖ 199 In its
constitutive function, Cox wrote, environmental communication helps to build
shared meanings and perceptions about environmental problems. The way we
communicate may help people see a given situation as a threat or a solution; as
a problem or as something desirable. 200
Manfred Oepen, looking from a strategic/persuasion viewpoint, wrote that
environmental communication is the ―planned and strategic use of
communication processes and media products to support effective policymaking, public participation and project implementation geared towards
environmental sustainability.‖ 201 According to Oepen, influencing the
policymaking process is a part of environmental communication as much as it is
to guarantee the implementation of projects that envision the protection of the
natural environment through public participation.
Oepen saw the role of environmental communication as an educative and
engaging social interaction process that enables people to ―understand key
environmental factors and their interdependencies, and to act upon related
problems in a competent way.‖ 202 Hence, environmental communication is not
only – not even mainly – a tool for disseminating information, but a process that
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aims at producing ―a shared vision of a sustainable future and at capacitybuilding in social groups to solve or prevent environmental problems.‖ 203
Oepen‘s understanding obviously excluded the role of journalism and
lobbying groups that are against environmental regulation. On the other hand,
David Sachsman, James Simon and JoAnn Valenti 204 presented the results of a
survey of 354 environmental reporters in four different regions of the U.S.
showing that almost all of the journalists (352) understood that environmental
reporters must be as objective as any other journalists. All of them defended that
environmental reporters should be fair to corporations and environmental groups
in the same way, and 69.5% believe that environmental journalists should not
work with community leaders to solve environmental problems.
Based on Sachsman‘s findings, Robert Wyss postulated that good
environmental journalists still have to follow the six tenets of journalistic work:
accuracy, thoroughness, balance, fairness, transparency, and passion. 205
Others believed that environmental journalism, like journalism in general,
may be an ―engaged‖ practice, because the role of the journalist is always to
defend the public interest under democratic concepts. In the first issue of
Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, Robert Cox
asked if environmental communication could be described as a ―crisis discipline,‖
like conservation biology. His argument was that some disciplines are created
203
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with the sole intent of solving specific problems (or crises). 206 Medicine, for
example, has the purpose of studying the human body with the intent to cure and
prevent ailments and promote health, like conservation biology has the purpose
to find ways to protect biodiversity and ecosystems.
Environmental communication encompasses much more than its crisis
facet, though. Historically, environmental communication started as nature
writing, aesthetic art, and scientific descriptions about the natural world with no
intent to stop or prevent a specific problem. Many pictures and depictions of
animals, plants, and landscapes had, and still have , the sole purpose of
entertainment or aesthetic pleasure, not a politically engaged one. 207
The environment—and therefore the communication about the
environment and environmental issues—surpasses most physical and
academics barriers. The concept of ―environment‖ is, in fact, larger than the
concepts of ―politics,‖ ―economics,‖ and ―society,‖ the traditional lenses through
which most social scientists and humanists see the world. Brazilian journalist and
professor André Trigueiro wrote that it would be much more accurate to describe
the environmental variable as ―systemic.‖ As researchers and practitioners define
certain facts for their sociological, political, economic, cultural, psychological,
anthropological (etc.) aspects and implications, they can also be understood for
their environmental aspects and implications. 208
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The systemic view in environmental issues draws on Deep Ecology‘s
philosophical understanding that everything in the universe is interrelated and
that we need to ask deeper questions if we are to understand our role within the
natural environment. 209 Therefore, in Trigueiro‘s understanding, more than just a
beat to be covered in the media, an environmental systemic view would add to
the other perspectives (social, political, economic, etc.), reconnecting human
society to nature and softening our anthropocentric views. This view was also
championed by the EPA's second Administrator and former President of the
World Wildlife Fund, U.S., Russell E. Train, and by William Shannon, former U.S.
ambassador to Ireland and former New York Times correspondent:
"environment" is not simply another problem to be solved or crisis
to be surmounted. … it is the overall and underlying context within
which we must weigh and deal with the various economic, energy,
and other crises and problems that confront us. 210

This concept adds a reconstructive aspect to the constitutive function in
Cox‘s formal definition of environmental communication. 211 Environmental
communication is then a prism or a lens through which we can understand the
universe around us. Such view of environmental communication also coincides
with that of James G. Cantrill and Christine Oravec, two of the first scholars to
define the field of environmental communication: 212 ―The way we communicate
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with one another about the environment powerfully affects how we perceive both
it and ourselves and, therefore, how we define our relationship with the natural
world.‖ 213
Cox also advocated that one of the essential roles of environmental
communication is to function as an educational tool to help public audiences and
policymakers to understand the nature of environmental contexts. 214 Cox argued
that ―individuals and communities have a stronger chance to safeguard the
environmental health and quality of their local environments if they understand
some of the dynamics of and opportunities for communication about their
concerns.‖ 215 A well-informed public is fundamental for good governance and
environmental communication is the right tool for the job, Cox wrote, for ―[i]t
educates, alerts, persuades, mobilizes, and helps us to solve environmental
problems.‖ 216 It also ―helps to compose representations of nature and
environmental problems as subjects for our understanding.‖ 217
Following a complementary approach, Corbett defined environmental
communication as a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. For her, not only
the information that is made available but also the way in which that information
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is made available – the communication process – defines how people and
communities see their role in society and the role of society itself. 218
For this study, it is important to understand a critical intersection between
environmental communication and the role played by environmental risks in the
society of the late 20th century and early 21st century. Cox, for example, credited
the importance of risk communication to the way in which it looks at the
effectiveness of communication strategies for conveying information about health
and environmental risks, the impact of cultural understanding of risk on the
public‘s judgment of the acceptability of a risk, and the ways to develop more
democratic methods to involve affected communities in evaluating risk. 219
Consequently, the role of risk communication about environmental issues is as
important as the role of environmental communication about risks in
understanding how environmental risks affect society‘s perceptions and
behaviors, especially in how it can drive the policymaking process.

Risk communication
According to the National Research Council (NRC), risk communication is
a means to open, responsible, informed, reasonable, scientific and value-laden
discussion of risks associated with personal health and safety practices involved
in living and working in close proximity to harmful activities and toxic
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substances 220 —a concept that was early adopted by EPA. 221 This view of risk
communication typically involves large organizations whose activities can pose a
risk to members of a community. According to Michael J. Palenchar, ―Risk
communication provides the opportunity to understand and appreciate
stakeholders‘ concerns related to risks generated by organizations, engage in
dialogue to address differences and concerns, and carry out appropriate actions
that can reduce perceived risks.‖ 222
Summarizing a variety of interpretive approaches to risk, Catherine
Althaus compared economic perspectives and models that distinguish risk from
uncertainty in which risk is a structured application of knowledge to uncertainties.
According to Althaus, anthropologists understand risk as a cultural phenomenon;
sociologists a societal phenomenon; economists a decisional phenomenon
related to securing wealth; legal researchers as a judicable phenomenon;
psychologists as a behavioral and/or cognitive phenomenon; linguists as a
concept; historians as material for narrations about past resource uses, and so
forth. 223
Having written extensively on the history of modern risk communication,
William Leiss described different eras of the field. According to Leiss, the risk
communication started as a source-oriented approach based on the locale where
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risks are present. It then evolved to its present approach of communication
based on shared social relations, focusing on experiences in common and public
relations practices.224 Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, S tephen
Read, and Barbara Combs found that risk ratings by laypersons, unlike those of
experts, are not influenced solely by fatality estimates and other statistical
measurements. 225 Differences in judgments among laypersons were affected by
numerous qualitative factors such as voluntariness, immediacy of effect, personal
knowledge about risk, available scientific knowledge about risk, level of control
over risk, newness, reach (chronic-catastrophic), fear level (common-dread), and
severity of consequences. Palenchar has written:
As such, there is no single psychology or sociology of risks . . .
Risks are not necessarily selected and perceived due to their
scientific merit or personal benefit, but out of a combination of
social and cultural factors, denotative and connotative reasons. 226

Regina Lundgren and Andrea McMakin, for example, listed nothing less
than 12 approaches to the study of risk communication: communication process,
the NRC‘s approach, mental models, crisis communication, convergence
communication, three-challenge, social constructionist, hazard plus outrage,
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mental noise, social network contagion, social amplification of risk, and social
trust. 227
In this study, the focus will be Susan Haden‘s look into the connections
between risk communication and the right to know. Hadden228 wrote that the role
of risk communication, very much like environmental communication, is to
function as a learning system that provides citizens with an understanding of
risks, hazards, and health issues, but that it also works to help people use this
knowledge in the political arena, improving public regulation and corporate
practices. ―If citizens are to take action based on information, they must
understand it,‖ 229 she wrote.
Hadden developed a four-level concept of right to know applied to
environmental risks involving toxic and hazardous chemicals. The ―basic‖ level
has the purpose of ensuring that citizens can find information about che micals
and holds the government accountable for ensuring that data are created and
available.
The ―risk reduction‖ level aims to reduce risks from chemicals, ―preferably
through voluntary industry action but also by government if necessary.‖ 230 In this
case, regulators should use information to create new standards or enforce
existing ones if industry fails to police itself.
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The ―better decision-making‖ level allows citizens to participate in the
decision-making process about the appropriate levels of hazardous materials in
their communities. The role of government in this level is to provide citizens not
only with analyzed data, but also with methods for manipulating and interpreting
data.
Finally, the ―alter balance of power‖ level empowers citizens to participate
in the decision-making process in the same or higher standing than government
and industry. The role of government in this level is to provide citizens with all the
information and tools as the other levels plus the means to participate.
Hadden‘s understanding of right to know and risk communication seems
to follow the pre-concept of a right to know developed by Thomas Jefferson as
not only a right to obtain information about government (a nd industry) actions,
but also to be educated about the purposes and functions of government (and
industry). Hadden took a step further by suggesting an actual ―means‖ to include
citizens in the decision-making process beyond the educative component.
According to Hadden, risk communication is a democratic tool for participatory
citizenship where the right to know is also the right to take part in the process. 231
Hadden‘s claim that community right to know reaches beyond the letter of the law
through the use of communication practices and techniques. Thus, the role
played by environmental risk communication is fundamental to understand the
development of the right to know in EPCRA as a different approach to policy that
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goes beyond the previous ―command -and-control‖ and ―market-based‖
approaches.
As seen in the work of Beck 232 and Cox, 233 environmental risks are at the
core of our understanding of society today. Robert L. Heath, Michael J.
Palenchar, Stephanie Protheau, and Tatjana M. Hocke reinforced the link
between environmental and risk communication:
The role of environmental and risk communication, and the
essence of its analysis and pedagogy, should be to increase the
quality of enlightened decision-making so that societies can be
more fully functional in their identification, assessment, and
management of risks. This requires the shaping and application of
a functional set of shared principles that have scientific validation
and reflect the cultural dimensions of a risk society. It is becoming
increasingly clear that the main product of environmental and risk
communication is not informed understanding as such, but the
quality of the social relationship it supports, becoming a tool for
communicating values and identities as much as being about
awareness, attitudes, and behaviors related to the risk itself. 234

Therefore, environmental and risk communication are not just ways to
inform the public about environmental risks, but processes of using information to
form identities, perceptions, and behaviors that will diminish—and even
completely change—the practices that produce those environmental risks.
Environmental and risk communication are educational and culture-forming
processes much in line with the understanding of the role of informed and
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educated citizenry of some of the American Founding Fathers and, later on, the
right to know as proposed by Susan Hadden. 235
In assessing Hadden‘s postulate, Palenchar concluded that ―strategic risk
communication highlights the importance of a dialogic, relationship-building
approach to address the concerns and perceptions of community residents and
employees, and one of the keys to success is supposed to be community-rightto-know initiatives.‖ 236 As a result of this understanding, the relationship between
those who produce risk and those who will suffer the consequences of the
actualization of those risks cannot be one of controller and controlled. Instead of
having one side controlling all the information about the risky practice, the
information generated by scientists should be shared with the neighboring
communities, so they can help each other to avoid harm, or, at least, to minimize
damages in the moment of crisis.
Heath and Palenchar defended the interrelation of community-relations
with risk communication. 237 In accordance with Hadden‘s defense of community
right to know 238 and other authors in environmental law, 239 they found in their
longitudinal study that educating and including the community in risk and crisis
planning generates higher awareness and more trust in companies‘ personnel
and government officials in the community.
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Following the right-to-know principle in public policy, environmental risk
communication has been used to inform, educate, and empower communities
facing environmental risks and injustices. Environmental risk communication can
become a vehicle for influencing and even controlling the policymaking process.
Organized citizens can gain media visibility and pressure politicians.
Corporations can educate the public about the reality of the risks their plants
pose and/or lobby governments to pass laws that are more favorable for their
businesses. As the next chapters demonstrate, the application of such concepts
under EPCRA has not only affected the development of EPCRA, but transformed
it into a new way to approach public policy.
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CHAPTER 4: THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO
KNOW ACT OF 1986—THE RIGHT TO KNOW AS APPROACH TO PUBLIC
POLICY
The statute was enacted based upon the fundamental principle that
an informed citizenry is essential to the democratic process and
that the more the American people know about their government
the better they will be governed. Openness in government is
essential to accountability and the Act has become an integral part
of the process.
Bill Clinton240
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act of 1986 241 is
such a different approach to law and policy that it has been heralded both as the
―most successful piece of environmental legislation‖ and a ―complete waste of
time‖ by different people and, sometimes, by the same analysts. June C.
Bolstridge, for example, mentioned that EPCRA has been considered ―a model of
information development and access in environmental regulatory circles,‖ and
that ―legislation similar to EPCRA is being evaluated by several other nations. 242
At the same time, Bolstridge observed that ―the law has been criticized for many
reasons.‖ 243
In this chapter, EPCRA will be described in a narrative based on the
official transcripts of legislative sections, newspapers‘ stories, 244 and a variety of

240

Bill Clinton on the Freedom of Information Act, 1993. Quoted in Jacobson, “Safeguarding National
Security,” 344/45.
241
EPCRA, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050)
242
Bo lstridge. EPCRA Data, 1.
243
Ibid., p. 2.
244
All newspaper stories were obtained through a combination of Lexis Nexis searches using the Boolean
terms “Emergency Planning and Co mmun ity Right-to-know Act,” “co mmunity,” “right to know,” “to xic,”

91

complementary documents 245 and secondary sources. Although a critical
analysis of the events will be part of this chapter, a more in-depth analysis of the
meanings and results of EPCRA‘s history, especially about the opportunities to
communication scholars and practitioners, will be presented on chapter 5. This
chapter picks up where the previous chapter left off on the history of the
Environmental Justice Movement as being a successful source of pressure in
implementing a few anti-toxic laws.
Unlike previous chapters, chapter 4 will be punctuated by quotes that
reflect the events and context of a specific period followed by the narration of the
events of that period. That was done not only to improve the historical narrative
and make it more interesting, but to also delineate and systematize the general
cultural, social, and political contexts of different moments of EPCRA‘s history.

“What do you expect? EPA lobbied against RCRA in the first place, and it
has no intention of ever aggressively enforcing it.” 246

Since 1976, when Gerald Ford signed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)—the first major piece of legislation that addressed the
specific problem of toxic waste management—and throughout Jimmy Carter‘s
“Florio,” “Superfund,” and “hazardous” conducted between 01/05/ 2007 and 07/06/2009. Stories were
crosschecked for facts and quotes were pulled fro m the newspapers. Preference for quotes was given to the
New York Times as it was the largest and most influential national newspaper at the time, but relevant
excerpts fro m s maller news venues, like the specialized magazine Chemical Week , were also added both for
context and to fill the gap whenever the NY Times didn‟t report on a matter of h istorical importance related
to the topic of this dissertation.
245
A list of sources for some historical documents can be found in the Appendix.
246
Hugh Kaufman, EPA‟s chief to xic investigator at the time, in an interv iew for the Philadelphia Inquirer
in 1979. Mowrey and Red mond, Not in Our Backyard, p. 211.
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presidency, there were many attempts to create a law that successfully controlled
the massive amount of toxic and hazardous materials being released into the
environment. 247 However, as Marc Mowrey and Tim Redmond‘s investigation of
the NIMBY movement showed, the laws were not necessarily the problem, but
the 9-year-old EPA.
In 1979, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
found that three years after the passage of the law, the EPA still
hadn‘t adopted a single RCRA regulation. Some 260 million pounds
of life-threatening chemicals were still being dumped every day,
without federal oversight. 248
Another problem EPA was facing at the time was the scientific uncertainty
about the effects of hundreds of chemicals. That included a large number of new
synthetics created by the fast evolving industry. Douglas M. Costle, EPA
administrator during the Carter Era, explained the situation in his oral history
interview for EPA with an example:
Steve Gage and his R&D people wanted to build an activated
carbon filtration plant at our Cincinnati laboratory, which was EPA's
major drinking water lab. They needed $40 million. That was a lot of
money in those days. When I asked why, they said, "We've been
sampling drinking water, using newer technologies of gas
chromatography and mass spectrometry. We can detect things now
that we couldn't a while back. We have found over 700 synthetic
organic chemicals in finished drinking water, of which eleven are
either known or suspected carcinogens, based on animal studies.
Well over 20 or 30 percent of these chemicals are relatively new
inventions." That is, they were substances that hadn't existed 20
years earlier but were just showing up now in sediments. I said,
"Are you telling me that water is not safe to drink?" They said, "No.
We don't know that. It will take several thousand mice, a team of
technicians, and several years to analyze, chemical-by-chemical,
and even then we don't have the methodology to determine what
247
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effects two or more of these chemicals interacting might produce,
as opposed to each acting individually. By the same token, we are
not telling you that the water is safe to drink. What we're telling you
is that we don't know, and there is no scientific silver bullet that is
going to give us the answer. So we want to build this laboratory to
see how effectively it can strip these chemicals out of this water." 249
Despite EPA‘s inefficiency in addressing toxic pollution issues, Carter‘s
administration‘s still had a last shot in trying to get both EPA and the industry to
control the release of toxic and hazardous substances into the environment. A
piece of legislation written by Jim J. Florio, a Representative from New Jersey 250
with experience in both environmental and commerce issues, was described by
some in the Anti-toxic Movement as its last hope to get comprehensive
legislation against toxic waste dumping passed before the administration of
President Ronald Reagan took power. Differently from Carter‘s, Reagan‘s
administration was seen in the movement as sided with the chemical industry
and other anti-environmental groups. 251
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“This Senate has made the judgement that property is more significant
than human beings”252

Florio‘s law, named Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), started out with a dispositive that,
besides being more aggressive and specific than RCRA and TSCA, put the
burden of paying for control and cleanup of toxic spills on industry and not on
government. The law was seen as revolutionary and a welcome solution for the
toxic spill problem by some anti-toxic activists, but also as an excessive burden
by industry representatives. The most important role CERCLA would play would
be to hold industry accountable for the costs of cleaning up the sites of past
violations of RCRA and TSCA and to improve on those laws by adding liability
provisions that allowed government to criminally prosecute and to fine noncompliant corporations. Retrospectively looking into CERCLA‘s role among antitoxic legislation, Lois J. Schiffer former Assistant Attorney General for the
Environment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
said:
CERCLA‘s liability provisions have caused a virtual revolution in
industry‘s approach to hazardous waste, providing a strong
incentive for pollution prevention and waste minimization efforts
that have reduced dramatically the amount of hazardous waste that
is generated in this country. 253
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However, Congress passed CERCLA stripped clean from its liability
clauses following the directions from the Chemical Manufacturers Association‘s
lobby. Consequently, CERCLA had most of its power taken away during its
enactment in 1980 and almost became moot, provoking Senator George J.
Mitchell‘s ire: ―[N]one of us should delude ourselves or the people of this country
that we have done anything more dishonorable,‖ Mitchell said. 254
With the Reagan Administration in power and especially with Anne
Gorsuch, a radical anti-regulation legislator from Colorado with ties to oil, gas,
mining, and timber company lobbies at the head of EPA, and the Anti-toxic
Movement‘s hopes dwindled:
Lois Gibbs had a lot of problems with EPA—as far as she could tell,
it wasn‘t doing its job. Gorsuch had problems, too: she thought the
agency was doing far too much. President Reagan had vowed that
―there are tens of thousands of … regulations I would like to see
eliminated‖—and the way Gorsuch saw it, there was no better place
to start than the EPA.255

Gorsuch was later accused among of other things of refusing to provide
information to the Congressional Public Works Committee investigating
Superfund enforcement, lifting the Carter administration‘s ban on the disposal of
a number of liquid chemicals in hazardous-waste landfills, the severe cuts on
EPA‘s enforcement staff, placing Rita Lavelle—a former public relations for
Aerojet-General Corporation, a chemical manufacturer and third worst polluter in
California—in charge of the Superfund program. Other accusations included
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hiring lawyer James W. Sanderson as part-time advisor while he was still
representing private clients—including a Chemical Waste Management, Inc.--,
and, the most grave of them all, destroying records of a pending legal case in
what became known as ―Sewergate.‖ Although Lavelle was arrested and other
ten EPA officers lost their jobs in the scandal, Gorsuch, near the end of her term,
avoided criminal charges and resigned in March, 1983. 256
As the Federal Government seemed to have become a dead end for the
Anti-toxic Movement‘s goals, they started to move the fight back to the local
level. In a later statement for the ―Views from the former administrators‖ section
of the EPA Journal, Gorsuch confirmed her will to make EPA ―lighter‖ and her
intention to put the toxic waste fight back in the state level;
My 22-month tenure as head of EPA was hardly the agency's most
serene hour. By the time I left, the air was filled with so many
charges, and the staff and I were so bogged down in the fight with
Congress over the doctrine of executive privilege, that the agency
itself seemed hardly to be functioning. …
It should be remembered that I came to office as part of a new
Administration that brought a different approach to solving the
problems of government. One of the te nets of that approach was
what we called New Federalism, or the idea that there were any
number of services being provided by Uncle Sam that could be
better provided by the states themselves. 257
Even before Gorsuch headed EPA, civil groups like Lois Gibbs‘s Citizens
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste started staffing up to do what EPA wouldn‘t:
provide expert reports and analyses for local and state governments concerned
with the proliferation of toxic-waste sites being revealed all around the country.
256
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Again, the enemies were scientific uncertainty and lack of information about the
causes and consequences of toxic spills, a situation that would start being
reversed by some local struggles for the right to know. Coincidentally or not, one
of the earliest cases happened in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, just across the
river from CERCLA‘s drafter Jim J. Florio‘s political home: Camden, New Jersey.

“[A] model for the rest of the nation.” 258

In 1980, Ralph Nader‘s Health Research Group and the Philadelphia Area
Project on Occupational Safety and Health proposed a toxic-right-to-know bill for
Philadelphia. The bill was set to fill an information gap for workers and residents
―who still [didn‘t] have a legal right to know about toxic substances in their
workplaces and community‖ according to its proponents. 259
A story published in Chemical Week260 showed mixed reactions from
industry. Philadelphia was home to more than 25 chemical companies at the
time, including Rohm and Haas, SmithKline, Arco, DuPont, Gulf Oil, Armak,
Purex and Pearsall. Robert Vogel, at the time chief of regulatory counsel of
Rohm and Haas summarized the industry‘s position saying that his company
―believes in the right to know,‖ but ―the bill produces no protection for legitimate
industry trade secrets.‖ 261
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The bill, a step forward from similar legislation either passed or being
discussed in other localities in California, Connecticut, New York, and Wisconsin,
passed six months after its proposition. 262 Foreseeing a ―maze of local rules‖
following Philadelphia‘s legislation on the right to know, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) 263 was compelled to act 264 and to provide
clearer standards then its previous rules, which permitted workers to examine
and copy only their own workplace medical and toxic-exposure records. 265 OSHA
tried in vain to harmonize the new, more citizen-empowering bill with the
concerns of industry. Thorne G. Auchter, then OSHA‘s head, told Chemical
Week in 1982: ―We propose to permit employers to include more protective
provisions in trade-secret confidentiality agreements with designated
representatives, while at the same time enabling access.‖ 266
OSHA‘s move was immediately rebuked by the director of the Health
Research Group, one of the main proponents of the bill. Sidney M. Wolfe said
that he believed OSHA was ―back-tracking‖ the legislation advancements.
―OSHA is trying to broaden the definition of a trade secret,‖ he said adding that
OSHA‘s proposition was against ―the letter and spirit‖ of earlier regulations. 267
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By 1983, OSHA‘s expressions of concern lest a ―maze of local
[environmental] laws‖ spring up proved to be well founded. By that year, 12
states and two cities, Cincinnati and Philadelphia, passed right-to-know laws.
Others, like Florida, followed the example. 268 However, at the same time, some
legislatures and courts were not upholding higher environmental standards.
Courts in general still held that the absence of a federal standard for right-toknow laws on toxic waste precluded the local and state legislation of creating
more rigorous laws on the subject. On the other side, state legislatures and both
state and federal agencies were influenced by legislators and company
executives with stakes in keeping such laws at bay. The New York Times
reported on one example in New Jersey:
An ad hoc coalition of environmentalists, trade unionists and
firefighters that has been supporting the state‘s proposed
Community and Workers Right to Know Act has filed a conflict of
interest charge against Borden R. Putnam, the state‘s
Commissioner of Commerce and Economic Development. …
The group, known as Citizens Action Right to Know Coalition told
the state‘s Executive Commission on Ethical Standards last week
that Mr. Putnam, a former senior vice president of the American
Cyanamid Company of Bound Brook, still owned $400,000 worth of
stock in the company.
Because Mr. Putnam stanchly opposed the measure during State
Senate hearings earlier this year, the group asserted, he violated
the state‘s code of ethics for government employees. 269
The New York Times also reported that American Cyanamid‘s Bound
Brook plant was on the EPA‘s superfund list and had been investigated before
and charged with polluting the Rarita n River. 270
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While local citizen groups were intensifying their fight for the right to know,
a large group of New Jersey business owners got fearful and their
representatives argued that the Community and Workers Right to Know Act
would force business out of state if they had to reveal trade secrets to the
competition. James C. Morford, a lobbyist and executive director of the New
Jersey Chamber of Commerce at the time, summarized their view for The New
York Times:
―That‘s what makes us nervous,‖ said Mr. Morford, alluding to the
disclosure requirement. ―It‘s not a matter of the public or
environmental groups knowing, but the concern is the competitor.‖
Mr. Morford said that the inadvertent disclosure of a trade secret by
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency last year caused the
Monsanto Company to lose a formula and, in the process, several
hundred thousand dollars in potential revenue. 271
In the same story, both Morford and a spokesman for NL Industry—a
producer of synthetic materials which had a plant closed in the previous year—
recognized that financial problems were the real reason companies in New
Jersey were at peril, not environmental regulations, as Leo H. Charney reported:
Mr. Morford acknowledged that no manufacturer had left the state
since 1970 because of New Jersey's strict environmental laws.This
last argument has been raised by environmentalists in support of
their position. However, Mr. Morford contended that, because of
poor economic conditions in general, and the ''lack of stability in the
tax climate,'' the Dalton bill could put New Jersey businesses that
were already in a precarious financial situation over the edge. 272
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Another evidence that environmental legislation were not at the core of
the problem presented by Charney in his report was that six hundred people who
were laid off from NL‘s plant joined the New Jersey OSHA/Environmental
Network in support of the right-to-know bill as a demonstration that environmental
and safety regulations were not to be feared. 273
At the federal level, ―Sewergate‖ was at its peak while Lois Gibbs‘s efforts
to professionalize the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste by adding
scientists and social scientists to its staff were finally paying off. Barbara Mikulski,
a Democrat Congresswoman for Maryland, after unsuccessfully trying to get EPA
to look into a toxic-waste problem in her home district, accepted Gibbs‘s offer to
use the Clearinghouse‘s expertise.
―Ms. Gibbs,‖ Mikulski answered, ―I accept your offer. Yet it is really
a bitter situation here. I worked all my life to become a member of
Congress… Here we are, big wheels, often more self-important
than we really are, and I can‘t get from Anne Gorsuch and her
cronies… the help that I need. I have to come to a citizens group,
that exists on voluntary contributions and bake sales.‖ 274
After Gorsuch and like-minded colleagues left the EPA, the situation didn‘t
change much. The Anti-toxic Movement needed a new push to get the fight back
to the federal level once more and end the stalemate. Althoug h thousands of
toxic spill sites were being revealed in the U.S. between 1980 and 1985, the
push came from elsewhere, in the form of a tragic accident in India.
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“We are in the dark. We are at risk. We are playing chemical Russian
roulette.” 275

On December 3, 1984, an accident in a Union Carbide pesticide plant
caused the release of a cloud of toxic gas over Bhopal, a city located in the state
of Madhya Pradesh in central India. Thousands died and many more fell ill from
breathing the gas.

276

The news hit home less than a year later when another

Union Carbide plant released a cloud of toxic gas over Institute, in West Virginia,
as reported by the Los Angeles Times:
The Institute factory had been touted by Union Carbide after the
Bhopal accident as a model of chemical-industry safety. But it
made headlines last Aug. 11 when an abandoned reactor tank,
accidentally filled with toxic methylene chloride and other
chemicals, boiled over and spewed 3,800 pounds of gas into a
nearby neighborhood. 277

Right after the Bhopal disaster, a team of experts and politicians, among
them Jim Florio, author of the Superfund law (CERCLA), visited the Institute
facility and deemed it safe. Another sign that even experts needed more
information. The accident was less tragic than Bhopal only because the gas
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leaked in an explosion, methylene chloride, in the Institute‘s plant was not nearly
as lethal as the methyl isocyanate (MIC) released in Bhopal. Nonetheless, almost
two hundred people were hospitalized, but nobody died. The incident could have
been much worse: Institute‘s facility also stored MIC.
The tragedy in Bhopal and the accident in the West Virginia at Union
Carbide plants gave new life to the Anti-toxic Movement. About the same time,
the People of Color Environmental Movement was created after the tragedy
involving a coal mine in Warren County in 1982. Representative Florio saw an
opportunity to reinstall some of the provisions that were stripped from the
previous version and to add a few more features based on the right-to-know laws
as developed in New Jersey and the city of Philadelphia.
Putting together all he learned from the failures of Superfund since the
enactment of CERCLA in 1980 and aiming to provide citizens a weapon to
protect them even from EPA if necessary, Florio and his staff worked on the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Among the goals of
SARA was to reactivate the liability provisions of CERCLA, and re -empower local
toxic-waste and right-to-know laws that were made moot by the lack of federal
standards. However, according to Florio and, later, to legal analysts, the most
important part of SARA was its Title III, a stand-alone piece of legislation focused
on community empowerment based on emergency preparedness and the right to
know. 278
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Referring to Bhopal and listing a series of accidents on American soil,
including his failed hearing at Union Carbide‘s Institute plant right after the
Bhopal tragedy, Florio wrote an opinion essay for The New York Times
announcing a two-pronged effort to address the toxic problems: first, a
comprehensive national investigation about ―the scope and nature of the
deliberate venting of toxic chemicals into the environment,‖ 279 and, second, the
legislation package later known as SARA. Florio pointed out that a ―key provision
of the package creates the first comprehensive national community Right to
Know program.‖ 280
Not two full months after Florio‘s opinion article, a chemical fire engulfed
four blocks of an industrial center in Passaic, New Jersey. A fireman died, 12
people were injured, and 400 people were left homeless. Donald A. Deieso,
director of environmental quality for the New Jersey‘s Department of
Environmental Protection, said in an interview for the New York Times after the
accident in Passaic that the ―unavailability of information on what chemicals were
used and stored in the factories and warehouses was ‗an atrocity.‘‖ 281 ―The
situation itself was glaring testimony for right-to-know legislation,‖ Deieso
added.282 At that point, New Jersey had its Community and Worker Right-to-know
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Act incapacitated by a Federal court ruling saying that less-stringent Federal
regulations took precedent over specific parts of the state law. 283
The accident in Passaic, among many others, led Florio to take action
once again. In the New Jersey Opinion section of the New York Times, Florio
repeated some of his arguments of his previous letter 284 (especially the
explanation of the how the new amendments he proposed would allow New
Jersey to reactivate its Community and Worker Right-to-know Act) adding a
vehement reprimand against the Reagan Administration, industry lobbyists, and
a number of congressmen:
If we are to eradicate the environmental nightmares that surround
us, we need a strong, effective Superfund hazardous-waste
cleanup program. But Superfund is in trouble. A coalition comprised
of the Reagan Administration, chemical-industry lobbyists and their
allies in Congress banded together to push through a House
committee legislation that fails to implement desperately needed
and fundamental reforms of the Superfund program. 285
Later in the in article, Florio readdressed his improvements of the bill,
which he explained in the previous article, and attacked EPA for failing to enforce
anti-toxic laws. In one specific example, Florio mentioned that EPA failed to
include dioxins, PCBs, phosgene or methyl isocyanate (the same of Bhopal‘s
catastrophe) in the list of chemicals that should be evaluated and have their
emissions limited. EPA officials told Florio‘s subcommittee that they ―had not
determined that the chemical [methyl isocyanate] was life-threatening or needed
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to be regulated.‖ In Florio‘s opinion, the U.S. government was regulating ―by luck
and chance.‖ 286
Florio was not reacting only to the events in New Jerse y. Two days
earlier, the U.S. Senate voted to provide $7.5 billion for five more years of
Superfund. The massive victory (86 to 13) ―reflected the broad public acceptance
and political potency that hazardous waste legislation has acquired since it was
first enacted,‖ 287 as Philip Shabecoff reported on the front page of The New York
Times. Florio knew that he had public support and that he had a unique
opportunity to add what he called ―the much needed amendments‖ to the bill
before the chemical-industry lobby could make it innocuous. 288

“Only the tip of the toxic iceberg” 289

Florio, as the Chairman of the House of Representatives‘ Subcommittee
on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, found himself in the right position to
take the superfund amendments ahead. Florio held a hearing 290 in Minnesota on
December 20, 1985 where the main provisions of SARA were discussed. With

286

Ibid.
Philip Shabecoff, “Senate backs bill for clean ing up hazardous dumps,” The New York Times, September
27, 1985, Section A, p. 1.
288
Flo rio, “Superfund must be tough and strictly enforced.”
289
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Co mmerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the Co mmittee on
Energy and Co mmerce, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session on Superfund
provisions: community right-to-know and cleanup of abandoned hazardous wastesites located at federal
facilit ies. December 20, 1985. Serial No. 99-72.
290
Gerry Sirkorski, Congressman for M innesota. Ibid., p. 2.
287

107

the New Jersey‘s right-to-know regulation preclusion in mind, Florio opened the
hearing:
The State should not take the lead in this area, for fear that State‘s
industries might move elsewhere in response to these new
requirements. That, it seems to me, is more than a strong argument
for the need for national uniformity in our environmental laws so we
don‘t have economics operating at cross purposes with appropriate
environmental protection, including the need for a national uniform
community right-to-know standard. 291
The state of Minnesota hadn‘t passed a right-to-know law and two local
congressmen who were at the top of the issue with Florio, Representatives Gerry
Sirkorski and Bruce F. Vento, were looking to push the right-to-know law on the
federal level. Sikorski described toxic-waste tragedies like Love Canal, Times
Beach, 292 and Reilly Tar 293 and pointed out the need for a better legislation:
Love Canal and Times Beach and Reilly Tar are only the tip of the
toxic iceberg. At thousands of waste sites across the country,
poisonous chemicals are seeping into our land, contaminating our
water, and fouling our air. In 1980, due in large measure to your
perseverance, Congress enacted the Superfund Program, and you
were the chief proponent of it. Its purpose was to clean up the
Nation‘s worst abandoned sites. Five years later the report card is
unsatisfactory. 294
291
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Sikorski explained that after five years at least 23,000 waste sites were
found to be contaminated with toxic sludge; a number that could reach 300,000.
Only 850 were added to the National Priority List and, after the expenditure of
$1.6 billion, not even one site had been ―completely and adequately cleaned
up.‖ 295 Sikorski also narrated how he introduced and fought together with Florio
for a bill aiming to correct the problems with Superfund. He cited ―citizens suits
and schedules and standards and a cleanup program for leaking underground
storage tanks, the LUST program, and strong provisions in Federal sites, and
community right to know‖ as the main provisions he and Florio were able to pass
in the House after a ―lonely fight in subcommittee and in full Energy and
Commerce Committee.‖ 296
Millions of Americans in thousands of neighborhoods exposed to
toxic chemicals have a simple, a fundamental right to know about
what chemicals, toxic chemicals, are being released into their
environment hour after hour, day after day, year after year. The
House bill, through our efforts, guarantees that Americans will be
provided with this information. 297
Equating federally owned and privately owned sites by enforcing the same
standards, deadlines, and oversight, Sikorski contended that the bill would
address the concerns of the private sector as well as of citizens groups. At the
same time, the provision allowing citizens‘ suits would prevent EPA internal
politics from inaction as federal agencies could also be prosecuted if they refused
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or failed to do their jobs. For Sikorski, the only blemish of the new bill was that
they (Sikorski, Vento, 298 and Florio) failed to convince the Committee to include
Bruce Vento‘s amendment ―allowing the fund to reimburse municipalities for new
costs in providing or acquiring alternative water supplies where a Federal agency
is a responsible party.‖ 299
Vento‘s testimony started with the same recognition of Florio‘s work and
then the specific casea of some municipalities in Minnesota having to pay to
clean drinking water contaminated by federa l facilities. Vento specifically was
upset with some dangerously toxic facilities of the Department of Defense (DOD)
and wanted the legislation to be clear that DOD would have to work with the
same standards and deadlines as everybody else. He identified at least 33 DOD
sites that needed to be cleaned up and mentioned that the Department of
Energy300 and other federal agencies probably had many more in the same
conditions.
Mr. Chairman, how can we expect the EPA to be successful in
cleaning up privately owned hazardous waste sites when the
Federal Government itself drags its feet in cleaning up its own
sites? … The citizens we represent are just as affected whether the
source of toxic pollutants is private or public. 301
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“Fundamental bits of information” 302

The hearing proceeded to two panels, one on the right to know and the
other addressing jurisdictional issues of governmental facilities included in the
new law. The first panel included the testimony of Darby Nelson, Minnesota State
Representative, and Peggy Ladner, speaking for the Clean Water Action Project.
Nelson started by comparing the environmental risks of the past, like cholera and
horse flies, 303 with the new environmental risks posed by toxic chemicals.
In those days, the environmental hazards, once understood, were
locatable and identifiable for all to see and for all to respond
accordingly. … [P]eople are simply unable in 1985 to properly make
those kinds of decisions about where they want to live, where they
want to recreate relative to potential health risks, and I guess the
fundamental role of government in my mind, and I would hope in
others, must be to do those necessary things for people that they
are simply unable to do for themselves. 304
In sequence, Nelson summarized not only the need for citizens‘ right to
know about toxic emissions and the location of toxic waste sites, but gave it both
an ethical justification and a future:
Certainly relative to community emergency planning it is incredibly
important that those locations be known and understood. It is
absolutely essential for firefighters, both for their personal safety as
well as for the safety of folks living in the immediate neighborhoods
where these materials are being stored and released, that those
fundamental bits of information be provided.
Third, we simply must provide people with information that may, in
fact, impact their chances of developing cancer, producing children
302
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with birth defects and other health problems. The issue, I think, is
absolutely fundamental and simple. People want to have maximum
direct control over their own lives. A community‘s right-to-know
regarding placement and emission of potentially hazardous
materials is a logical and I think important extension of consumer
labeling, cigarette health warnings, workers‘ right-to-know, and the
like. A person ought to have the right to intelligent, educated,
personal choice about the relative degree of risk he or she finds
personally acceptable.
Community right-to-know in addition to that I think can be a source
of incredible valuable long-term epidemiological data in
environmental risk factors. 305
Nelson‘s testimony embodied most of the intent with which Florio had
written the law, but also based the reasoning behind the right to know on the
principle of self-governance and the simple principle that, as he described, had
been applied to other laws, that it is the people and not government or industry
who have the right to choose the amount of environmental and health risks with
which they are willing to live. However, to be able to exercise such right, people
need to be educated about those risks.
Nelson also commented on the need for a federal law, mentioning his
1984 rejected bill in Minnesota as an argument for the need of the federal
government‘s involvement to set the example. Nelson listed the same objections
by the opposition for the rejection of the bill that Florio experienced in New
Jersey: Minnesota‘s business owners complained that such bill at the state level
would create extra paperwork, secret information would be compromised, and
costs of doing business in the state would drive businesses away. Nelson wasn‘t
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finished, though. After accusing President Reagan, the Senate, and specifically
EPA for their inaction, he mocked the absurdity of the situation:
If the Soviet Union had secretly conspired to deposit these
thousands of leaking hazardous waste sites around the country to
insidiously damage our groundwater and the health of our citizens,
such action would clearly have been labeled the most heinous act
of biological warfare. There are times I wish the Russians had done
it, because if the Russians had done it, perhaps the cleanup would
be considered part of the national defense, would come under the
defense budget, and perhaps we would not have had to have
waited for 5 years and see so little have been accomplished if that
had been the case. Federal inaction has simply dumbfounded
me. 306

“The opponents said that being responsible for that safety or injury was
too expensive. … [I]t convinced a lot of legislators that safety from toxics
was not worth it.” 307

Peggy Ladner, Midwest Director for Clean Water Action Project, followed
Nelson‘s testimony and focused her opening statement on the arguments raised
by industry representatives against right-to-know laws. According to Ladner, the
threats of deserting the state made by business owners were moot, because the
real problem was not the costs associated with the right-to-know laws, but the
high prices of liability insurance in case the law held them liable. ―We kne w they
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would not be able to get environmental impairment liability insura nce no matter
where they went.‖ 308
For Ladner, it didn‘t matter where the companies would move , the
insurance companies would apply the same standards in Texas or California.309
The problem in her view, wasn‘t the argument, but the perception created by it.
The fear provoked by the threat was enough to convince legislators to reject
right-to-know provisions in Minnesota. ―That tactic has been used in North
Carolina, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and many other States,‖ Ladner
said. ―We cannot solve this problem in Minnesota. It has to come from
Washington. Congress must put an end to State shopping, or at least the threat
of it, by polluters,‖ she added. 310
In her written statement, Ladner emphasized several reasons for federal
statutory involvement in the matter: lack of uniformity between and among
states, similar to a situation that Florio had witnessed between Pennsylvania and
New Jersey. Ladner declared:
It‘s not OK for people in New Jersey to have the right-to-know while
people in Minnesota do not. It‘s not OK for our neighbors in
Wisconsin to go uncompensated for medical expenses due to toxic
exposure while Minnesotans may apply to the victim‘s
compensation fund.
Ladner also addressed some problems created by the Reagan
Administration in the EPA by cutting agency staff and support services for
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mandated programs 311 and recommended the passage of a strong right-to-know
program as ―the first step towards long-term solutions.‖ For Ladner, besides the
predictions made by Nelson about the data on toxic chemicals, she added that
with better science linking toxic chemicals to health problems, polluters would
have two choices: either accept almost certain liability or find ways to reduce
hazardous waste. ―We believe responsible business people will certainly choose
the latter,‖ she concluded before presenting 100,000 signatures the Clean Water
Action collected in Minnesota in support of the law. 312
With such arguments collected, Florio felt he had demonstrated that there
was a need for a federal law and that the purpose of the law was to put the cost
of information-gathering on polluters, the burden of overseeing and storing the
information on local and federal governments, and the responsibility of enforcing
the law on citizens. Florio then prepared his bill and his arguments knowing that
he had enough support to take it to the congressional conference.
In 1986, after the committee and congressional conferences, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act was enacted. Finally, the
national campaign against toxic waste had won the war for the right to know.
However, it had also won the responsibility of proving that informed citizens
would do their part. And for that purpose, they needed more than information:
they needed education.
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Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act was the
first federal environmental law requiring that information be made
directly available to the general public through a variety of
mechanisms. The law has been criticized for many reasons, and
one of the most deep rooted criticisms is that the law provides the
―right-to-know‖ but not the ―right-to-understand.‖ 313

“It‟s what he calls „risk communications.‟” 314

The enactment of EPCRA provoked a surprising change of tone from the
industry representatives. Many large chemical companies tried to be among the
first to voice their support for the law against which they had fought so fiercely.
Newspapers reported a series of examples where industry worked with citizens
groups to diminish the use of toxic and hazardous materials in the years following
the enactment of EPCRA.315 The enactment of a federal law nullified the ―state
shopping‖ arguments and also provided one simpler standard for all, instead of
the ―maze‖ of state and local legislations predicted by OSHA. 316
The agricultural chemical industry joined in an unusual alliance with
environmental and consumer groups today to propose specific
legislation to strengthen the law controlling the use of pesticides.
The legislation would speed health and safety testing of pesticides
already in use and impose a fee on their manufacturers to help pay
for the tests. 317
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Politicians also jumped on the bandwagon declaring how all sides were
cooperating for the success of EPCRA. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-New
Jersey), who got the cartoon-character-style nickname ―Toxic Avenger‖ after
being appointed to head the Senate Superfund Oversight Subcommittee, told
reporters that he fought particularly hard to defend Florio‘s ―right to know‖
language in the bill. Ever the politician, Lautenberg also praised the role of
industry in the process, saying industry leaders approved the final legislation and
helped draft it, but also tried to please right-to-know defenders:
―We don‘t want to pester them [chemical companies] to death,‖ he
said, ―and we don‘t want to make our chemical industry
noncompetitive. But we believe our citizens in eve ry community
have a right to live without fear of pollution or contamination from a
nearby industrial facility.‖ 318

One reason behind this friendly environment could have been that, once
enacted, EPCRA not only empowered citizens to sue companies and
government agencies that were not in compliance or not doing their jobs, but also
reactivated stricter state legislation, such as New Jersey‘s Community and
Worker Right-to-know Act. 319 In that way, EPCRA created a massive trickledown
effect that put the power of enforcement in the hands of thousands of
environmental and environmental justice organizations and citize ns‘ committees.
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Even if the lawsuits were not successful, 320 the expenditures with legal costs and
scientific investigations could have been monstrous both for private corporations
and governmental agencies. The law charged them for the costs of any
investigations carried out by citizens. EPCRA had its first success: it scared
companies and governmental agencies into collaboration.
Another consequence of EPCRA was the expansion of a whole area of
expertise in public relations. Because of the toughening of public attitudes on
environmental problems, industry needed to deal with the situation in a different
way. 321 Crisis management and risk communication became buzzwords as
industry executives named liability and corporate responsibility as the forces
behind the new approach:
For corporations today, a prime concern is the potential liability they
face from the abandoned dumps, according to Lloyd N. Newman,
executive vice president of Manning, Selvage & Lee, a subsidiary of
D‘Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles. He added that a number of
companies also feel some moral responsibility. 322

In the same story, another executive described the generic changes in
corporate practice the new approach would entail:
He said that ―companies are going to have to put information in
perspective so people are not unduly concerned about the data‖
that are being supplied to the local committees. To that end his staff
is prepared to develop brochures, videos and slide presentations to
explain a company‘s compliance with the law. He also has a
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sensitivity-training program to teach employees to communicate
with a plant‘s neighbors. 323

For some companies, which believed EPCRA was a beneficial evolution,
risk communication was used not only to improve relationships with local
communities and government, but also to identify new possibilities for future
profits. For the other companies, ―risk communication‖ quickly became a
synonym for a practice later known as ―green wash.‖

“The days are over when industry can just dump anything and say, „Trust
us on this‟” 324

Two years after the enactment of EPCRA, the deadline for the first Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) was approaching and newspapers reported on the
―revolution‖ 325 created by EPCRA‘s right-to-know approach. More than 200,000
people distributed in approximately 3,000 committees were set up to handle the
flood of information coming from an estimated 30,000 industrial facilities. 326
However, the greatest ―revolution‖ according to Charles Elkins, director of EPA‘s
office of toxic substances at the time, was that data on chemical hazards in
communities were going to be in people‘s home computers. 327
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James L. Makris, director of emergency response programs for EPA at
the time, expected that TRI would ―open a national dialogue around the issue of
chemical risk.‖ 328 Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of EPA at the time, said the
whole thing could be something negative as it meant ―a lot of paperwork,‖ but he
believed that, in a final analysis, it could be ―very significant in shaping the way
the public views environmental issues and sets priorities on those issues.‖ 329
The expectations around the results of the first TRI to be released in July
1988 were very high. The most important concept at stake was Florio‘s idea that
the right to know would really get people to act and do their part. ―The ultimate
question is, will we achieve the Jeffersonian ideal of informed citizens who can
take a responsible role in making public policy?‖ Michael S. Baram, professor of
law at Boston University‘s Center for Law and Technology, summarized. 330
The answer to Baram‘s question came swiftly as companies in general
were trying to adapt to the new requirements, which demanded almost twice as
much work as EPA initially predicted, and were surprised by their own reports
and afraid of the public‘s reaction:
―The figures would come out as thousands of pounds‖ of chemicals
a year, said Medhat Reiser, Nespera‘s environmental affairs
director. ―When people see big figures like that, they are always
immediately scared.‖ 331
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However, industry, government, and citizens noted a difference in how the
roles of industry in communities changed as a result of EPCRA. The results of
the first TRI showed an amount of toxic chemicals much higher than anyone
expected. 332 EPCRA, which required the creation of local emergency
committees, forced industry to deal with the consequences of its production faceto-face with local communities for the first time. 333
Many corporations started immediate changes in their production systems
aiming to reduce and, in some cases, to completely stop the use of toxic and
hazardous chemicals. In 1988, just two years after EPCRA became law, Garland
Ross, a senior engineer at Yale Materials, told Charles L. Elkins, EPA‘s director
of the Office of Toxic Substances, that EPCRA was having a real effect. Ross
said that his company already had started to change the chemicals it used for the
next year. He added, ―I hope we can [then] report that Yale has no toxic
chemicals to report. 334
Representatives of Monsanto—one of the largest producers of pesticides
and other toxic chemicals—recognized that TRI pushed them to reconsider how
effectively they used raw materials. It also transformed what began as an
environmental measure into a cost-control program as well. 335
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Not long after the first TRI, President George H. W. Bush‘s administration
and Congress passed a new Clean Water Act 336 and the Clean Air Act, 337 and he
became known as the ―environmental president.‖ 338 After a few years TRI
brought the confirmation that EPCRA was, at least in part, a success. ―The total
releases in 1989 were 1.3 billion pounds less than that reported in 1987, and 723
million pounds less than industries released in 1988,‖ reported The New York
Times.339 However, there were still 22,650 industrial plants releasing 5.7 billion
pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment, which added to the cumulative
effects and the spreading of contaminated sites. The public wanted more and
faster remedies, the story asserted: ―Today a coalition of 16 national
environmental groups and 80 state and community organizations released its
own report that said the Toxic Release Inventory does not go far enough in
accounting for pollution.‖ 340
The coalition pressured EPA to expand the list of chemicals in TRI and to
include other measurements that included not only the release and storage of
toxic chemicals, but also their use during the manufacturing process. From 1991
336
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to 1994, most of the news mentioning EPCRA or related topics referred to
specific contamination issues and health problems in different localities, including
the area that would later be called ―Cancer Alley‖ between the states of Texas
and Louisiana.
EPA would respond in part, by doubling the list of chemicals in 1994,
during the administration of Bill Clinton, who openly defended EPCRA‘s right-toknow provisions against a legislative attempt to weaken EPCRA that failed to
pass in the Senate in 1995. 341 The attempt followed an industry reaction against
EPA expansion of the TRI with the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)
filing a lawsuit against EPA, which was decided in the agency‘s favor in 1996. 342
John H. Cushman Jr. reported for The New York Times in June 1995:
Senators attacking Federal regulations have taken aim at what
would seem to be one of the least burdensome but most effective
of environmental rules: a requirement that manufacturers disclose
how much they pollute.
Senators J. Bennet Johnston, Democrat from Louisiana, and Trent
Lott, Republican of Mississippi, are trying now to narrow the
program that costs little besides paperwork and requires no specific
pollution controls but that has spurred industry to reduce emissions
of toxic chemicals voluntarily by billions of pounds a year. 343

By 1995, TRI reported total releases of 2.8 billion pounds, a 43% drop in
releases since the first TRI in 1988. Carol M. Browner, EPA‘s Administrator at the
time, representatives of the Environmental Justice Movement and other citizens
341
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groups, specialists from environmental groups, and even part of the industry
associated with the Chemical Manufacturers Association went out in defense of
EPCRA. The attacks from Association and the senators from the top polluter
states prompted, among other things, an open defense of EPCRA in President
Bill Clinton‘s State of the Union Address:
I applaud your desire to get rid of costly and unnecessary
regulations, but when we deregulate let‘s remember what national
action in the national interest has given us: safer food for our
families, safer toys for our children, safer nursing homes for our
parents, safer cars and highways and safer workplaces, cleaner air
and cleaner water. Do we need common sense and fairness in our
regulations? You bet we do. But we can have common sense and
still provide for safe drinking water. We can have fairness and still
clean up toxic dumps and we ought to do it. 344
Clinton later announced that 50 Republicans broke ―ranks in the House
and said they would put the environment ahead of party,‖ after the bill attacking
EPCRA and other environmental laws was rejected on the House floor. 345 In the
same year, Clinton also signed an executive order to force industry to comply
with the expanded list of toxics. Clinton used the force of the federal
government‘s contracts to indicate what industry could lose if they chose not to
comply, as Jacobson narrated:
President Clinton was an especially strong advocate of right-toknow legislation, at least publicly. In 1995 he signed Executive
Order 12,969 as part of a fierce budget battle between his
administration and the Republican-led Congress. The Executive
Order was announced at a highly publicized signing ceremony in
Baltimore attended by 400 local citizens, politicians, environmental
groups, and unions. … He then explained the Executive Order by
344
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saying, ―I signed an executive order which says any manufacturer
who wants to do business with the federal government must tell its
neighbors what dangerous chemicals it puts into the air, the earth,
and the water.‖ 346
In 1997, EPA finally published the expanded TRI. The new TRI included
more analytical tools for its interpretation, making it easier on the general public,
especially environmental justice organizations, to understand its reports.
Unfortunately, a new law in 1999 stopped the improved TRI information from
being published because Congress thought such information might be used by
terrorists in planning attacks. OMB Watch, 347 a watchdog organization for open
government and the right to know in environmental issues , took on the
responsibility predicted by Florio and published on their website what EPA was
forbidden to publish. 348 OMB later created the ―Right-to-know Network‖ based on
that report.
Advocates of releasing the information say the compilation of the
summaries could show the public that the information was kept off
the Internet more to avoid embarrassing chemical companies than
to impede terrorists. They say that hundreds of accidents occur at
plants each year, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
acknowledged only a single thwarted act of sabotage, against a
chemical plant in 1997. 349
From that point on, and over and over again, the ―terrorism argument‖
would come back, made either by industry or government, only to be disproved,
especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001.
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However, the work of environmental justice and anti-toxic groups, plus some
sectors of the news media and citizens‘ organizations including OMB Watch
would make sure that much environmental awareness information would be
available to the public. By the end of President George W. Bush‘s Administration
on January 20, 2009, EPCRA still remained the most comprehensive example of
a right-to-know approach in the United States. Environmental justice and antitoxic groups were still pushing for new laws that include reports of toxic and
hazardous materials used in manufactured products using a right-to-know
approach.
EPCRA was reasonably successful in its role, but not without obstacles.
The most powerful threat to the idea of the public‘s right to know came in the
form of a reaction against the terrorist attack of 2001.
Four airplanes were taken down by terrorists associated with the extremist
group Al-Qaida on September 11, 2001, causing the destruction of the World
Trade Center towers and surrounding buildings in New York and damage to the
Pentagon in Washington D.C. resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths. The attacks led to
heavy reassessments on whether information about potential targets for terrorists
should be disclosed in any way.
The issue has generated fierce debate between environmental
activists and industry representatives. The focus of the debate has
been on the conflict between dissemination of information to the
public and attempting to keep potentially harmful data out of the
hands of terrorists. 350
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Soon after the attacks many governmental agencies began to pull
sensitive information from their websites and other sources. 351 The U.S.
Geological Survey, for an example, recalled CD-ROMs containing information on
bodies of water and asked all recipients to return them to the agency to protect
lakes and rivers from terrorist attacks. 352 The Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(―Patriot Act‖), passed by the U.S. Congress in reaction to the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, significantly altered a considerable number of laws, including
many related to information policy.
With the introduction of the Patriot Act 353 in October 2001 and the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CIIA), many corporations used the excuse
of protecting sensitive targets from terrorist attacks to stop providing informati on
about hazardous materials to communities under the EPCRA. 354
While the discussion between national security and community‘s right to
know have become very inflamed, 355 the legal literature tends to support the idea
that community‘s right to know did not hamper efforts to improve national
351
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security, and it actually improved safety and security awareness in the involved
communities. 356
Chekouras listed a few ways of how states used legal measures to attend
the community‘s right to know without putting homeland security in harm‘s way.
The use of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) predicated in EPCRA 357 is one of
them:
In this ever-changing atmosphere, states maintain the ability to
supplement EPCRA and maintain or enhance the dissemination of
information to communities. With TRI being heralded as an
effective method of decreasing toxics, state efforts at maintaining
tough public disclosure requirements may continue to ensure safer
facilities. By requiring information that is beneficial to local
communities while respecting legitimate security concerns, states
can reduce the hazards present and decrease chemical facilities‘
attractiveness as terrorist targets. 358

This chapter showed the resilience of EPCRA even when it was under
attack by industry, Congress, and the Executive power together. Florio‘s intent to
create a law that would resist the lethargy of EPA resulted in a law that, based on
the right-to-know principle, kept creating opportunities for citizens to organize and
hold both government and industry accountable for pollution and environmental
injustices.
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CHAPTER 5: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK COMMUNICATION IN EPCRA

―I‘ll tell you
What the world‘s like: like a stone for no reason falling in the night
from a cliff in the hills, that makes a lonely
Noise and a spark in the hollow darkness, and nobody sees and
nobody cares. There‘s nothing good in it
Except the courage in us not to be beaten. It can‘t make us
Cringe or say please.‖
Robinson Jeffers

359

As Ulrich Beck predicted, 360 the risk society of the late 20th and early 21st
centuries has shown that exclusive reliance on ―command and control‖
governance is not sufficient. With that approach, government sets and enforces
(sometimes half-heartedly) rules (often weak) through penalties, and that has not
worked adequately. The proof is in the pollution. Also, ―market-based‖
palliatives such as offering tax reduction incentives to industries have proven not
to reduce risks efficiently or sufficiently. Again, the proof is in the pollution. 361
Beck‘s argued presciently that only with community involvement in
resolving public policy issues will nations be able to reduce risks by increasing
personal and public responsibility on one side, and governmental and corporate
accountability on the other. 362
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Hadden‘s called for institutions that ―allow and encourage citizens to work
with both government and private industry.‖ 363 According to her, that would
transform the right to know into a right to participate in the formulation of policies.
Hadden‘s call presented a challenge yet to be met by environmental and risk
communicators, governmental agencies and policymakers. EPCRA‘s history
shows the attempts of Representative James J. Florio of making the right to
know larger than a law: a new approach to public policy. The ability of
environmental justice organizations and the general public of improving EPCRA
depends in great part on their ability of understanding information and of using
communication to get organized and participate in the decision making, as
Shapiro found. 364 The role of environmental risk communicators in citizen
organizations becomes ever more crucial, then, as they are specialists in
understanding and translating scientific and legal information into meaningful and
useful information to the lay public.
EPCRA‘s history also shows that the law pushed, at least partially,
industry into creating better practices that reduced the use of dangerous
materials and encouraged safer ways to work with them. Far from an ideal
situation, EPCRA was created to be a ―first step‖ of a new legislation system to
control, and maybe eliminate, the release of toxic and hazardous chemicals into
the environment and communities.

363
364
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This chapter will present first a brief legal analysis of how EPCRA works,
and then offers a critical look into how the history of EPCRA contributed to the
study of environmental risk communication.

A legal description of EPCRA

EPCRA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986, listed 400 out of 60,000
chemicals in commercial use in the United States as extremely hazardous. 365
The right to know observed in environmental impact statements obligates riskgenerating organizations to provide complete, truthful, and accurate reports
about toxic and hazardous materials to the local governments. 366 The burden of
revelation fell on the risk-generating organization, not on the government, which,
according to Hadden, should ―ensure that the other parties can exercise their
rights and fulfill their responsibilities . . . [by] designing and, if necessary,
redesigning public policies.‖ 367
EPCRA also allowed citizens to enforce the law through civil suits 368
based on any of the civil, administrative, or criminal penalties listed on section
325, which include the failure to provide complete, truthful, and accurate
information. However, to be able to enforce the law, citizens needed first to be
able to access, understand, and process the information into action. 369 According
365
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to EPA‘s own regulation, EPA has an ―affirmative responsibility‖ to collect and
disseminate information to further public health and environmental goals:
―Empowering the public with information helps assure [industry] compliance with
existing laws and encourages companies to take additional measures to reduce
industrial chemical releases.‖

370

One way EPCRA promotes public participation in the decision-making
process is through the requirement of the formation of Local Emergency Planning
Committees (LEPC), which are designed to plan for manufacturing emergencies
and to serve as monthly community forums where local residents, government
officials, industry representatives, health and safety officials, and any concerned
individuals and organizations can request information and voice concerns. 371
EPCRA and LEPCs have four major provisions: emergency planning, 372
emergency release notification, 373 hazardous chemical storage reporting
requirements, 374 and the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), 375 which requires a
publicly available EPA database that contains information on toxic chemical
releases and other waste management activities reported annually by certain
covered industry groups as well as federal facilities.
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By putting the burden of revelation on risk generators and mandating
community-right-to-know practices, EPCRA allowed communicators in nongovernmental organizations, governmental agencies, corporations, and media
outlets to take the law beyond the boundaries of government enforcement and
transform it into a more participatory and democratic tool. At the same time, it
costs less for the government to enforce the law—as risk-generating companies
pay for the paperwork and communication. Also, revelation increases community
awareness of the problems they may have in case of a toxic spill or discharge.
Sometimes, this awareness can even bring companies to change the chemicals
for less toxic ones and improve security and quality of life for all in the
community. 376

EPCRA‟s opportunities for environmental risk communication

The intent behind EPCRA, as seen in chapter 4, was to bring the public
into the policy process. Since its adoption, the public has been invited to voice
their opinions and to participate in the process, especially in EPCRA‘s
enforcement and reevaluation. The structure of EPCRA, as seen above, differs
from the structure of most laws as it follows a tripartite-dialogical approach
between public, industry, and government based on information, as Bolstridge
wrote:
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Most importantly, EPCRA did not require the EPA to evaluate or
interpret the information collected, but only to make the information
available in its original form and through some specific types of
reports and analyses. The law is based on the premise that it is the
responsibility of the public to ask questions and of facilities to
address questions as they arise. 377

The contribution of EPCRA to the policy process after the failure of
previous legislations, in consonance with Beck‘s description of the failure of
governmental institutions in Risk Society, was to provide a way for society to
achieve a necessary social goal—the reduction of environmental and health risks
related to toxic and hazardous materials—despite the inefficiency of government.
However, as noted by Bolstridge, 378 EPCRA intentionally did not provide some of
the tools to transform simple information into a true participatory system.
According to Florio‘s own writings, 379 EPCRA , as an amendment to
CERCLA, was a provision that should be easy for industry to comply with, 380
inexpensive for government to administer, and empowering to citizens. The idea
was that, once the information was compiled and published, scientists and
citizens‘ groups could use it to make connections and see which facilities were in
compliance with the earlier federal environmental legislatio ns and the local and
state laws and regulations.
An interesting result of EPCRA was that it also allowed the facilities to
keep an inventory of the amount of materials being wasted as seen in both
377
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Monsanto and Yale Industries, 381 allowing these companies to save money on
top of getting better environmental standards. Moreover, provisions that allowed
citizens to file lawsuits not only against facilities, but also against governmental
agencies, gave ―teeth‖ to the law, as Ladner mentioned during the 1985 hearing
on EPCRA. 382
In addition, the most important result of EPCRA was forcing industry
representatives and government officials to sit down with community members
and talk to them: explain what they were doing, how they were doing it, and why
they were doing it. This information allows community members to choose the
amount of risk they will accept to bear in exchange for economic and social
benefits provided by the presence of the company in their neighborhood.
However, as seen in a few cases, these relations hips ended up freeing some
communities from further exposures to toxic and hazardous materials.
EPCRA was not a law made to regulate toxic chemicals but to compel the
enforcement of other laws that were already in place and to foster the creation of
new and better ones. Most importantly, EPCRA was designed to get all groups
involved to sit together and find solutions. An effort envisioned by Florio in face of
the failure of previous approaches to the problem. This may not have worked in a
large number of cases because of insufficient community leadership or an
apathetic citizenry, 383 but it certainly was an improvement to the state of affairs
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existing before the enactment of the law. The premise and promise of EPCRA is
a systemic approach to policy based fundamentally on communication to create
an informed public. Therefore, right-to-know laws are different from commandand-control and market-based laws, as Alexander Volokh explained:
But what does it all mean? Environmental-information laws are
often misunderstood. Because they do not directly regulate
production, right-to-know laws are generally considered more
benign than traditional command-and-control regulation. Their
advocates commonly depict them as ―voluntary,‖ ―market-based‖
programs—and many in the policy community, including those who
are often critical of command-and-control regulation, have accepted
this characterization. Yet such a description masks several crucial
elements of right-to-know programs. 384

In order to make this approach work, citizens need to be supplied not only
with information, but also with an understanding of their role in the political
process. If, as Jefferson said, the people are the ―depository of the ultimate
powers of society,‖ 385 members of the public need to know how the decisionmaking process in their society works and how they can exercise their ―ultimate
powers.‖
The first step is then to help people to understand the situation in which
they find themselves, to know the risks of living where they live, and even the
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concept of risk. People need to know what can be done to reduce or eliminate
those risks and to understand the situations driving the polluters who created the
risks in the first place. Beyond that, people need to understand what government
can and cannot do or will or will not do to deal with risks. People also need to
understand and avail themselves of the coping mechanisms put in place to
manage the risks, and to know what to do if the risks threaten to become—or
actually become – crises. More simply put, people must know the key variables
at work and the choices available. Only then can people make real choices.
However, the ―languages‖ of scientists, bureaucrats, and businessmen
are not the ―language‖ of the majority of the people who live in the communities
where those risk-bearing facilities are located.
It is difficult for communities to understand statistical assessments,
biomedical descriptions, detailed environmental analysis, economic estimations,
and insurance evaluations, and so forth. The majority of the population in the
areas of risks, as research has shown, 386 is usually composed of lower income
workers who are too busy finding ways to keep their jobs, feed their families, and
386
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give an education to their kids. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is said to be
too complex even for some specialists. When uninformed people see that
chemical ―x‖ is being released in hundreds of thousands of pounds a year and
chemical ―z‖ was released in a mere dozen of pounds, they may not be able to
tell that an ounce of chemical ―z‖ might be thousands of times more toxic than ten
pounds of chemical ―x.‖ Hence, information alone is just not enough. 387
Volokh listed some of the most common problems found in EPCRA.
Among them, he mentioned that a) TRI data are self-reported and are not
checked for accuracy, b) TRI data are highly sensitive to changes in reporting
guidance estimation methods and changes in production levels, c) EPCRA does
not apply to facilities with under ten full-time employees, and d) many toxic
substances are not included in the over 600 TRI reportable chemicals as they are
not currently used in large enough quantities, which may be an incentive to
replace listed chemicals with non-listed chemicals. 388
Nonetheless, Volokh contended that, even with its loopholes, EPCRA has
been successful in its objectives:
The TRI requires nothing but reporting, but has had a large effect
nevertheless. Stock analysts, house hunters, and environmentalists
use its data to evaluate companies and neighborhoods. Journalists
and policy analysts use TRI data to inform debates on the
effectiveness of environmental policy or to argue for more stringent
regulation. State agencies use TRI data to track their own
environmental progress. Businesses do too—capital markets seem
to care about this new source of information, and the TRI seems to
have prompted emissions reductions and increased environmental
387
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compliance. Small wonder that environmental officials call TRI one
of the most successful federal environmental programs. 389

The process Volokh described reveals the importance of the involvement
of communication professionals. 390 Specialized science, health, environmental,
financial, risk, legal, and political communicators, analysts, jour nalists, and public
relations practitioners are able to compile and synthesize the information given
by experts in different areas and transform it into something meaningful and
relatable to the daily lives of the affected communities. 391
In this case specifically, environmental risk communicators are prepared
to understand all involved variables and put into a narrative form that makes
sense to the community members. A risk communicator in a corporation can
transform hundreds of pages of numbers, economic projections, and cost-benefit
analysis into a simple ―if we change this, we will have to increase the product‘s
price by this much,‖ or ―cut this many jobs,‖ etc. An environmental communicator
in an environmental justice organization can transform a massive amount of
political, legal, and scientific data into digestible list of risks and choices.
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More importantly, as Hadden 392 explained, environmental risk
communicators can educate community members to know how to protect
themselves through environmentally healthy practices, legal actions, and political
negotiations. Understanding how the ―system‖ works, citizens can make use of a
number of tools to get their voices heard.
Research has shown that even in relatively minor tragedies, as Love
Canal turned out to be, communities that were able to use media and political
influence obtained social gains and even elimination of the cause of risks. 393
However, sound scientific research can provide more long-lasting gains at the
macro level as it builds on the pool of k nowledge and provides better arguments
for better laws and better decisions. 394
As seen on chapter 3, the roles of environmental risk communicators fit
well with Florio‘s intent for EPCRA. The academic and legal literature analyses of
right-to-know provisions in general have shown that, based on the use of
communication tools and techniques to educate the public, such provisions are
usually cheaper, more efficient, and more democratic than provisions based on
either on ―command-and-control‖ and ―market-based‖ approaches alone,
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specially on topics involving a complex set of variables. 395 The history of EPCRA
represented in this dissertation is evidence that a right-to-know provision can be
a powerful complement to other types of legislation.
Environmental risk communication, allied to other social, educational, and
communication processes also helps to improve the organization and
cohesiveness of social groups and movements. 396 That characteristic was seen
in the history of EPCRA in how the broad Environmental Justice Movement, and
specially the Anti-toxic/Environmental Health Movement, was able to organize
and become much more influential in order to obtain the results they desired.
Lois Gibbs and historians of environmental health and justice mentioned
that Love Canal was not the first and, by far, not the most tragic environmental
incident involving toxic contamination, but because of the community
organization driven by Gibbs, it became a turning-point in the fight against toxic
contamination that led to the enactment of CERCLA.397 Similarly, McGurty
demonstrated that the main reason Warren County is considered the birth of
Environmental Justice Movement was because of the level of organization it
presented, attracting national attention. 398
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The right-to-know approach of EPCRA opened a number of opportunities
for communication practice and research that entails more analyses to be
adequately understood. Consequently, new laws based on the right-to-know
principle being enacted in more than 80 countries are opening a vast new market
for communication research, but also for professional journalists, public relations
practitioners, and communication specialists in health, science, legal, and
political communications. The global trend identified by Florini and Shrivastava 399
of right-to-know legislation has become a new phenomenon, reflecting Beck‘s400
predictions, but it all started with one piece of legislation, born from the failure of
the political process and the claims of citizens in 1986. 401

What does it all mean?
A few conclusions can be made from the history of EPCRA. First, the right
to know in EPCRA cannot be traced to one single origin as it was born from the
cries of thousands of citizens and the Anti-toxic and Environmental Justice
Movements. However, the theoretical and philosophical construct found in the
legal and academic literature after EPCRA 402 could be verifiably related to the
ideas of self-governance and the right to know about the purposes of government
championed by Thomas Jefferson during the times of the American Revolution.
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Second, EPCRA‘s unique characteristics—which go beyond the text of
the law and allowed for non-governmental organizations, grassroots groups, and
a few private organizations to build analytical and educational tools to
complement and maximize the force of the law even against Congress and
EPA—were not a coincidence or ―fluke‖ of the system. They were, in fact, a
conscientious effort of the legislators, like James J. Florio and Gerry Sikorski, to
experiment with the right to know as a new approach to policymaking to correct
what they saw as fatal flaws in CERCLA. The governmental failure to enforce
and the private sector refusal to comply showed them that neither ―commandand-control‖ nor ―market-based‖ approaches were enough to get industry to
reduce the use of toxic chemicals.
Florio, who was also the author of CERCLA, specifically mentioned that
the intent of EPCRA was to give citizens the power to do what government
couldn‘t. During the hearing of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, Florio discussed with Nelson, Ladner,
Sikorski and Vento what would happen if the community-right-to-know provision
didn‘t pass. They all agreed that it would leave EPCRA ―toothless.‖ 403 The
combination of the right to know with citizens‘ suits provisions in EPCRA put the
enforcement power in the hands of the people who felt they were being
victimized either by industry or by governmental agencies.
Third, although full of loopholes and being targeted by oppo nents
throughout the more than 20 years of its existence, EPCRA seems to have
403
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achieved its main goals of reactivating and boosting local and state legislations,
creating a database on the release of toxic materials, reducing the use of toxic
and hazardous materials in general, and allowing citizens, scientists, and private
organizations to participate in the decision making on such issues.
Most of the criticisms directed to EPCRA, strangely enough, were part of
what EPCRA was supposed to accomplish. As Bolstridge 404 pointed out, one of
the worst criticisms made against EPCRA is that it provides the right to know, but
not the right to understand. However, both by following Hadden‘s analysis 405 and
by reading Florio‘s intentions for EPCRA, 406 that burden to educate was built into
EPCRA to be part of what citizen organizations would do. These organizations
were to work with, and demand participation from if necessary, governments and
private corporations to improve understanding of the topic. Florio and others
predicted that, once the information was put out there in an organized form,
scientists, policymakers, and citizens‘ organizations would study the database
and improve it. 407 The newspaper stories from the 1990s and early 2000s proved
that EPCRA did that.
Other criticisms were that the list of toxic chemicals to be reported in TRI
was too small and that it also should include chemicals not only stored and
released, but also those used in the manufacturing of products. The idea was to
create a system of checks and balances to keep track of toxic chemicals, to
measure amounts acquired by a given facility and where those chemicals would
404
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go: into storage, into products, or into release of chemicals into the environment.
Chapter IV showed that, although very slowly, the EPA was successful in nearly
doubling the number of chemicals to be included into the Toxic Release
Inventory. That may still not be enough for people who want to be free of toxic
chemicals, but it shows a progress that could be repeated.
What Florio couldn‘t have predicted was that the next step: the expansion
and improvement of the law in consequence of the needs discovered through the
information gathered in the Toxic Release Inventory, the Local Emergency
Planning Committees, and by corporations and citizens organizations. Such
improvement has not happen in the United States by the end of this study408
because of the change of political focus in the face the threat of terrorism after
1999 and, especially, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As Rena
Steinzor told the Senate‘s Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental
Health in 2007, ―More than any other environmental program, Superfund is a
victim of compassion fatigue and political doublespeak.‖ 409
However, EPCRA‘s right-to-know approach became a model for more
than 80 other countries (as of 2009), which have enacted laws under the same
principle. Some of them, like REACH in the European Union, have already
expanded the concept of the right to know in EPCRA to embrace not only the

408
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release of toxic materials but also labeling of products that contain any potentially
hazardous materials.

410

In the end, EPCRA‘s history showed that, as a piece of legislation,
EPCRA was a step further than previous legislation aiming to control and reduce
the release of toxic materials in the environment and communities. However, as
an approach to policy making, the right to know in EPCRA became even more
successful. It survived a series of direct attacks thanks to the workings of
organized citizens who wouldn‘t give up the window opened by EPCRA.

Limitations of this research
This research presented the application of a historiographic method that,
following the discussion raised in chapter 1, sought to carefully and accurately
represent a history of EPCRA focusing on its right-to-know principle. In order to
achieve that the researcher identified proper primary sources, crosschecked
those sources against other primary sources for verification and completeness of
information. The researcher also sought the guidance of secondary sources and
experts in communication history, journalism, risk communication, and
environmental sociology. The main limitation was the lack of funding which
prevented the researcher from visiting the archives and collections of primary
documents and to search for unknown sources that are not listed in the literature
or in other primary sources.

410
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However, thanks to the effort of many libraries, archives, collections, and
other groups in charge of preserving historical documents, the great majority of
the documents mentioned and cited in this dissertation could be found in digital
format. Some of them were copied and added to the Appendix to facilitate
verification by peers. Others are listed with hyperlinks in the Appendix with the
same purpose.
The very few documents of which the researcher could only find
transcriptions but not a digital copy of the original were crosschecked with the
secondary sources and the credibility of the facility that made such transcription
available. Only the ones that were cited by at least two independent secondary
sources and could be found on the website of a reliable database were included
in the text of the dissertation. With that process, the researcher hopes to have
reduced such limitation to a minimum. Nonetheless, in the historical process,
many sources might be unknown or found unexpectedly during interactions with
people who either participate in an historical event and their families or work as
custodians of personal collections.
Besides, the funding limitations, the general limitations of the historical
process also played a role in this study. There is no way to find out what the
Founding Fathers or the Framers of the Constitution intended with their writings
and/or actions. The failure to find in the literature and in the primary sources any
detailed reference to the right to know in the period between 1822 and 1953 also
darkens in part the understanding of its evolution.
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The search for people who were involved in the enactment of EPCRA, like
James J. Florio, and more primary sources will be the next step in this research
line.

Future Research
This dissertation is only a necessary first step in developing a body of
research that can truly and accurately represent the impact of the right -to-know
approach to public policy and its meaning for the study of communication. As
seen in chapters 4 and 5, EPCRA opened a series of opportunities for
communicators to inform and educate the public (broadly defined to include
government officials, industry e xecutives, scientists, and citizens in general)
about how to best participate in the public arena and achieve better decisions.
The history of EPCRA allows researchers in the fields of communication,
history, sociology, law, political sciences, social service, toxicology, waste
management, environmental studies, and any other field related to emergency
preparedness and public policy issues to understand how information can be
used to improve the social-political process involving the release of toxic and
hazardous materials. It also serves as stepping stone for extrapolation and
exploration of how right-to-know provisions can affect other areas.
The next step for the researcher will be to look into the discourse and
practice of communicators, politicians, go vernment officials, scientists,
community organizers, lawyers, and other people directly involved in the process
of expanding the scope of EPCRA, from a source of information, to a system of
148

education about public participation, health, safety, environmental justice,
government, and so forth, like the authors of EPCRA intended. Following
Professor Baram‘s question whether informed citizens could take a responsible
role in making public policy following the Jeffersonian ideal, 411 EPCRA‘s history
seems to indicate that citizens can, at least in part. Perhaps reliance on the
people is too often politicians‘ empty rhetoric, and perhaps reliance on the people
is pointless. Such a cynical conclusion, however, flies in the face of the
republican foundations and democratic strivings of the experiment known as the
United States of America. More detailed research on efforts to use EPCRA,
chronicling and analyzing successes and failures, can give a better picture of
using the right to know principle to empower communities to protect and to
improve themselves.

Concluding remarks
With all justified and unjustified criticisms, EPCRA‘s right-to-know
provisions have been proven to be able to provide openness in government even
when government itself was fighting for secrecy. It was an approach created to
circumvent the actions of Gorsuch‘s EPA and ended up circumventing a
congressional attempt to shut it down in 1994/1995, an industry lawsuit from
1994 to 1997, a gag order against EPA in 1999, and anti-openness laws—USA
Patriot Act in October 2001 and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002
(CIIA)—after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
411
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Furthermore, EPCRA, in some cases more successfully than others,
brought governments, companies, and citizens to sit together to discuss common
goals on the use of toxic and hazardous materials in American society. Thanks to
it, environmental and civil rights organizations used EPCRA as a starting point to
educate and to organize communities. Governmental agencies were able to
share the burden of control and enforcement with the civil society. Ethically
driven corporations improved their rapport and relations with local communities.
The news media used EPCRA to fulfill their historic roles of watchdogs of
government.
As corporations increased in power during the 20 th century, often having
more effects on peoples' lives than government, they were insulated from the
watchdog function. Before EPCRA, openness legislation, including the federal
Freedom of Information Act, applied only to government executive-branch
agencies, excluding legislatures, leaving corporations shrouded in secrecy.
EPCRA removed, at least in part, that shroud.
As Gibbs wrote, this discussion changed the focus from how much toxic
contamination society could bear to how much toxic contamination can be
avoided altogether. 412 EPCRA became focus of both supporting campaigns and
attacks in local, state, and federal levels, but put the discussion of toxic pollution
in the mainstream of national topics. It may still need revisions and amendments,
but the literature on EPCRA reaches a rare consensus: it was the first step for a

412
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different kind of policymaking. Even President Bill Clinton attested to the
resilience of the right to know against the deeds of Congress:
The message here is clear. The Congress can go right along with
its plan to undermine America‘s anti-pollution laws, but it will go
nowhere fast. Community right-to-know is here to stay.
Bill Clinton413

413
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To CONCLUDE, however strange it may appear to some, or
however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many
strong and striking reasons may be given to show that nothing can
settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined
declaration for independence. Some of which are,
First. — It is the custom of Nations, when any two are at war, for
some other powers, not engaged in the quarrel, to step in as
mediators, and bring about the preliminaries of a peace; But while
America calls herself the subject of Great Britain, no power,
however well disposed she may be, can offer her mediation.
Wherefore, in our present state we may quarrel on for ever.
Secondly. — It is unreasonable to suppose that France or Spain
will give us any kind of assistance, if we mean only to make use of
that assistance for the purpose of repairing the breach, and
strengthening the connection between Britain and America;
because, those powers would be sufferers by the consequences.
Thirdly. — While we profess ourselves the subjects of Britain, we
must, in the eyes of foreign nations, be considered as Rebels. The
precedent is somewhat dangerous to their peace, for men to be in
arms under the name of subjects; we, on the spot, can solve the
paradox; but to unite resistance and subjection requires an idea
much too refined for common understanding.
Fourthly. — Were a manifesto to be published, and despatched to
foreign Courts, setting forth the miseries we have endured, and the
peaceful methods which we have ineffectually used for redress;
declaring at the same time that not being able longer to live happily
or safely under the cruel disposition of the British Court, we had
been driven to the necessity of breaking off all connections with
her; at the same time, assuring all such Courts of our peaceable
disposition towards them, and of our desire of entering into trade
with them; such a memorial would produce more good effects to
this Continent than if a ship were freighted with petitions to Britain.
Under our present denomination of British subjects, we can neither
be received nor heard abroad; the custom of all Courts is against
us, and will be so, until by an independence we take rank with other
nations.
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Full text Document:

LIBERTY OF THE PRESS By Thomas Paine .
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1083
&chapter=19329&layout=html&Itemid=27 (accessed February 6, 2009)
LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.1
The writer of this remembers a remark made to him by Mr.
Jefferson concerning the English newspapers, which at that time,
1787, while Mr. Jefferson was Minister at Paris, were most vulgarly
abusive. The remark applies with equal force to the Federal papers
of America. The remark was, that ―the licentiousness of the press
produces the same effect as the restraint of the press was intended
to do, if the restraint was to prevent things being told, and the
licentiousness of the press prevents things being believed when
they are told.‖ We have in this state an evidence of the truth of this
remark. The number of Federal papers in the city and state of NewYork are more than five to one to the number of Republican papers,
yet the majority of the elections go always against the Federal
papers; which is demonstrative evidence that the licentiousness of
those papers is destitute of credit.
Whoever has made observation on the characters of nations will
find it generally true that the manners of a nation, or of a party, can
be better ascertained from the character of its press than from any
other public circumstance. If its press is licentious, its manners are
not good. Nobody believes a common liar, or a common defamer.
Nothing is more common with printers, especially of newspapers,
than the continual cry of the Liberty of the Press, as if because they
are printers they are to have more privileges than other people. As
the term Liberty of the Press is adopted in this country without
being understood, I will state the origin of it, and show what it
means. The term comes from England, and the case was as
follows:
Prior to what is in England called the Revolution, which was in
1688, no work could be published in that country without first
obtaining the permission of an officer appointed by the government
for inspecting works intended for publication. The same was the
case in France, except that in France there were forty who were
called Censors, and in England there was but one, called
Imprimateur.
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At the Revolution, the office of Imprimateur was abolished, and as
works could then be published without first obtaining the permission
of the government officer, the press was, in consequence of that
abolition, said to be free, and it was from this circumstance that the
term Liberty of the Press arose. The press, which is a tongue to the
eye, was then put exactly in the case of the human tongue. A man
does not ask liberty before hand to say something he has a mind to
say, but he becomes answerable afterwards for the atrocities he
may utter. In like manner, if a man makes the press utter atrocious
things, he becomes as answerable for them as if he had uttered
them by word of mouth. Mr. Jefferson has said in his inaugural
speech, that “error of opinion might be tolerated, when reason was
left free to combat it.” This is sound philosophy in cases of error.
But there is a difference between error and licentiousness.
Some lawyers in defending their clients, (for the generality of
lawyers, like Swiss soldiers, will fight on either side,) have often
given their opinion of what they defined the liberty of the press to
be. One said it was this, another said it was that, and so on,
according to the case they were pleading. Now these men ought to
have known that the term liberty of the press arose from a fact, the
abolition of the office of Imprimateur, and that opinion has nothing
to do in the case. The term refers to the fact of printing free from
prior restraint, and not at all to the matter printed, whether good or
bad. The public at large,—or in case of prosecution, a jury of the
country—will be judges of the matter.
Thomas Paine.
October 19, 1806.
[1]From the American Citizen, October 20, 1806. Paine had
witnessed in France (see vol. iii. p. 138) the terrible effects of
personal libels shielded under the liberty of press.—Editor.
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December 20, 1985. Serial No. 99-72.
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Protect Public Health. October, 2007.

182

LEXIS NEXIS results were too extensive to be inserted here. The
articles were saved to an electronic file that can be consulted by
contacting the researcher. A description of the search can be found
in chapter 1.
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